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A TALE OF TWO MARKETS: 
REGULATION AND INNOVATION IN  
POST-CRISIS MORTGAGE AND STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS 
 
WILLIAM W. BRATTON* 
ADAM J. LEVITIN** 
 
Abstract 
This Article takes the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the financial 
crisis to review recent developments in the structured products market, connecting the 
emergent pattern to post-crisis regulation.     
The Article tells a tale of two markets.  The financial crisis stemmed from 
excessive risk-taking and shabby practice in the subprime home mortgage market, 
a market that owed its existence to the private-label, originate to securitize model.  
But the pre-crisis boom in private label subprime mortgage-backed securities could 
never have happened absent back up financing from an array of structured products 
and vehicles created in the capital markets—the CDOs that found their way into 
CDO squareds, SIVs, and synthetics, magnifying subprime credit risk and 
carrying it into the system’s vulnerable nodes where the bailouts occurred in 2008.  
The post-crisis regulatory pattern shifts the emphasis back from the end point in the 
causation chain (magnified risk and bailouts) to the start point (residential mortgage 
origination and securitization).  It is only at the start point, in the world populated 
by consumers and their immediate counterparties, that we find anything like new 
prohibitions.  The capital markets side of the picture is touched much more lightly.  
Even so, at a quick glance today’s structured products market looks like a 
qualitatively different place—subprime RMBS, CDOs, CDO squareds, CDO-
based synthetics and SIVs are all gone.  This Article takes a closer and longer look 
at today’s structured products market to show that the difference between now and 
then is more a matter of degree.  The new regulatory landscape for structured 
products has definite borders, and it is at just those borders where the beat of 
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financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage goes on.  This activity is not centered 
at the banks, for there private label originate-to-securitize and investment in private 
label products is affirmatively discouraged by post-crisis regulation.  Today’s 
innovation in structured products occurs at the more lightly-regulated nonbanks, 
which are displacing the banks at the riskier end of the residential mortgage and 
corporate lending markets.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 It was the best of times, then it was the worst of times.  
Financial markets soared in the mid-2000s, only to collapse in the 
financial crisis of 2008.  The crisis stemmed from excessive risk-taking 
and shabby practices in the “subprime” segment of the home mortgage 
market, a market that got its financing from an array of “toxic” 
products and investment vehicles created in the structured credit 
market—private-label mortgage-backed securities (PLS), collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs), collateralized debt obligations squared 
(CDO2s), synthetic securitizations, and structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs).   These products provided the funding for the mortgage 
lending that enabled housing prices to be bid up in an unsustainable 
bubble.    
Ten years later, both the home mortgage market and the 
structured credit market look different in many respects.  Subprime 
mortgages, CDOs, CDO2s, and SIVs have entirely disappeared, and 
the PLS market looks very different, implying fundamental change.  
But there are also places where the markets before and after differ only 
by degree—some risky consumer borrowers still find mortgage 
lenders, the private structured credit market remains in place and still 
collateralizes certain debt obligations, and synthetic securitizations still 
appear.   
How much of this change is the result of post-crisis regulatory 
prohibition and how much results from changes in investors’ appetite 
for risk?  To the extent that regulation, rather than appetite for risk, 
has caused the changes, which of the new constraints have proven 
salient and for what reason?   Where does the regulation leave open 
loopholes and regulatory arbitrage by intermediaries and investors with 
voracious appetites for risk? 
To answer these questions, this Article takes a deep dive into 
today’s credit markets to ascertain and trace the transactional pattern 
ten years later.  We take a close look at risky mortgage lending and 
complex securitization structures and map the market activity against 
the new regulatory background.  Our inspection leads to a pair of 
important observations about post-crisis regulation.   
First, we identify a distinction in the post-crisis regulatory 
approach between consumer markets (the subprime mortgage loans 
BRATTON & LEVITIN 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
2
themselves) and the capital markets (the toxic structured products that 
funded voluminous subprime lending).  The post-crisis regulatory 
approach, we argue, is a tale of two markets that mismatches the 
immediate government response to the crisis itself even as it reflects 
the political economy of financial regulation.   
The immediate federal response to the financial crisis was a 
series of market interventions—bailouts—of both individual financial 
institutions and capital markets more generally.  In contrast, consumers 
received much less in the way of succor from the federal government 
directly, even though consumer mortgage defaults were the root of the 
crisis.  One would expect, then, that the post-crisis regulatory response 
would focus on the institutions and markets that received bailouts in 
order to confirm the politicians’ oft-repeated pledge of “no more 
bailouts.”  Yet that is the opposite of what emerged.  The post-crisis 
regulatory response has been much more muscular in consumer 
markets than in capital markets.   
On the consumer side, there are new constraints on mortgage 
lending that apply to all lenders.  The provisions impose exacting 
standards of underwriting and documentation that combine to impose 
a conservative attitude toward risk.  They effectively prevent the return 
of a large subprime loan market.  Post-crisis enforcement initiatives by 
federal and state prosecutors and agencies reinforced this regulatory 
shift.  They focused mostly on problems in the pre-crisis mortgage 
market and with post-crisis mortgage servicing, casting a prospective 
chill over the origination and management of risky mortgages.   
On the capital markets side, things are different.  Financial 
regulators did not respond to the crisis by imposing thorough-going 
underwriting standards or defining and prohibiting categories of 
dangerous structured transactions.  Nor did they impose a tax or 
regulatory constraint on financial innovation.  Instead, they tightened 
two existing legal regimes: (1) the disclosure rules applied to new public 
issues of securities, and (2) the rules regulating risk assumption by 
institutions intertwined with the public interest, banks most 
prominently.  Nothing in post-crisis regulatory reform stops a private 
actor from packaging or purchasing a CDO or CDO2, although there 
are additional regulatory burdens:  the packager will have to satisfy 
stepped up disclosure requirements if it sells to the public (rather than 
in a private placement), and it will in many cases have to retain some 
4/26/19] A TALE OF TWO MARKETS 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
3
credit risk.  Additionally, banks (defined in regulation as insured 
depository institutions) are now discouraged from securitizing assets 
by rules move securitized debt onto their balance sheets and 
discouraged from investing in securitized assets by rules that require 
substantial equity capital support.  The new constraints dampen 
innovation indirectly by making securitization more expensive and 
reducing demand for structured products.  Even so, marketplace 
intermediaries remain free to create structured products keyed to the 
risk appetites of the legions of institutional investors that are not 
regulated as banks.   
Overall, regulation has been tightened much more significantly 
in consumer markets than in capital markets.  Post-crisis enforcement 
actions have followed the same pattern, focused primarily on 
residential mortgage origination and securitization rather than on 
broader issues related to structured products.   
The contrast between the heavier regulatory touch in 
consumer markets (and for banks) as opposed to the limited 
interventions in capital markets speaks to the political economy of 
financial regulation.  Interventions in consumer markets are likely to 
be more politically salient to consumer-voters because they address 
products that consumers use directly.  Moreover, even if consumers 
do not understand the technical details of a particular reform, they do 
understand its top-level characterization as “consumer protection.”  In 
contrast, reforms in capital markets, other than perhaps trading 
markets open to retail investors, are, if anything, more technically 
complex and lack a direct connection to the interests of consumers.  
As a result, there is likely more political pressure (and political upside 
for regulators) to focus reform on consumer markets.  One expects 
less in the way of regulatory intervention in capital markets, where 
political pressure is less acute. And this is precisely what we see.   
Our second observation about post-crisis regulation concerns 
unintended effects.   The intensification of regulation of banks has 
resulted in a hydraulic market shifts.  Banks, more heavily-regulated 
and more than a little gun-shy in the wake of post-crisis litigation 
initiatives by prosecutors and regulators, have walked away from the 
riskier end of the residential mortgage market.  Less-regulated, 
nonbank lenders, almost wiped out by the financial crisis, have since 
reemerged to fill the void in the riskier part of the mortgage market.  
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Nonbanks also loom larger in today’s structured product markets, 
where they have taken the lead in innovative packaging and sale.  The 
question is not whether innovation is being choked off, but whether 
the seeds of the next crisis are being sown by innovation in lightly 
regulated sectors.   
Our Article makes several contributions to the literature.  First, 
it provides the first look at the role played by structured products in 
post-crisis financial markets.  A large literature emerged in the wake of 
the financial crisis focusing on what went wrong in particular markets1 
before 2008 and the extent to which post-crisis regulatory reforms 
addressed the problems.2  But this literature emerged in the 2009-2012 
period, before the key reforms became effective.  It thus could not 
inspect the reforms’ market impact and could only analyze the reforms 
as they appeared on the books.   Now, ten years after the crisis, enough 
time has lapsed to let us track the changes in the markets and connect 
the changes to the regulatory response.  To date, no scholarship has 
attempted to take stock of the transactional impact of the full panoply 
of post-crisis reforms.   
Second, our Article contributes to the literature on the political 
economy of financial regulation.  Recent scholarship has highlighted 
the intensely politicized nature of financial regulation and its 
distributional consequences.3  Our Article illustrates the disconnect 
 
1See, e.g., Sergey Chernenko, The Front Men of Wall Street:  The Role of CDO Collateral 
Managers in the CDO Boom and Bust, 72 J. FIN. 1893 (2017) (CDOs); Daniel Beltran, et al., 
Asymmetric Information and the Death of ABS CDOs, Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l 
Fin. Discussion Paper No. 1075r, 6 (Nov. 2016) (CDOs); William W. Bratton & Adam Levitin, 
A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal from Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 SO. CAL. R. REV. 
783 (2013) (synthetic CDOs); Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Commercial Real Estate 
Bubble, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83 (2013) (commercial mortgages and securitization); Adam J. 
Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012) 
(mortgages and PLS); Larry Cordell et al., Collateral Damage:  Sizing and Assessing the Subprime 
CDO Crisis, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working paper no. 11-30 (2012) (CDOs); Adam J. 
Levitin & Tara Twomey, 28 YALE J. REG. 1 (2011) (mortgage servicing); KATHLEEN ENGEL 
& PATRICIA MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:  RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND 
NEXT STEPS (2011) (mortgages and securitization); GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE 
INVISIBLE HAND:  THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010) (repo markets); HENRY TABE, THE 
UNRAVELLING OF STRUCTURED INVESTMENT VEHICLES:  HOW LIQUIDITY LEAKED THROUGH 
SIVS, LESSONS IN RISK MANAGEMENT AND REGULATORY OVERSIGHT (2010) (SIVs).     
2 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd Frank Act and Housing Finance:  Can It Restore 
Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market, 29 YALE J. REG. 155 (2012). 
3 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei:  the Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution 
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between the political problem faced by regulators in 2008-2009—the 
need to bail out various capital market institutions and markets—and 
the regulatory response in 2010-2014, which focused primarily on a 
different set of markets—consumer financial products.  This 
observation underscores both the greater political salience of 
regulation of consumer markets, which more directly affect more 
voters, and the lack of political will in Congress and the regulatory 
agencies to insist on needed reform in the absence of focused interest 
group demand.     
Third, our findings present a riposte to a scholarly critique of 
post-crisis regulation as crude, knee-jerk overregulation, which should 
be presumptively rolled back.4  Thus, Professor Roberta Romano, has 
laid out a four-part “Iron Law” of financial regulation, namely that it 
is crisis-driven, features crude off-the-rack solutions, fails to anticipate 
market dynamism, and is too hard to amend or repeal.5  Our findings 
generally comport with Professor Romano’s first three points of 
Professor Romano’s first three points (it is too early for them to bear 
on the fourth).  But we make additional observations and thereby flip 
the anti-regulatory critique on its head. As to Professor Romano’s first 
point, post-crisis regulation is indeed crisis driven.  How could it not 
be?   It also often is off-the-rack and at times does not fully account 
for market dynamism.  Yet, despite all of this, substantial pieces of 
post-crisis regulation get it right.  Sometimes the off-the-rack suit fits.  
Moreover, some post-crisis regulation is highly innovative.   And its 
failure to anticipate market dynamism does imply malfunction.  It 
simply shows the post-crisis construct to be incomplete.  Its fault is 
not that it gets it wrong, but that there isn’t enough of it.   
 
Bankruptcy, 97 N.C.L.REV. 243 (2019); Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking:  Finance and Democracy, 83 
CHIC. L. REV. 357 (2016); Adam J. Levitin, Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of 
Financial Politics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991 (2014);  Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics 
of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399 (2012); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Dodd-Frank:  Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1019 (2012); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2010); Anna 
Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493 (2009). 
4 See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1024-25 (describing these scholars as the “Tea Party Caucus” 
of the legal academy).  
5 Roberta Romano, Further Assessment of the Iron law of Financial Regulation: A Postscript to 
Regulating in the Dark at 1, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working 
Paper No. 273/2014, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 515 available at 
https://ssrn.com/abs=2517853; see also Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, 1 J. FIN. 
PERSP. 1 (2013). 
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Fourth, our Article fits the enforcement response to the crisis 
into the broader regulatory picture and explores its impact on post-
crisis market activity.  Although regulation through enforcement 
figures prominently in the post-crisis response, it tends to be viewed 
separately from formal rulemaking.  We develop data on the fines 
imposed in connection with federal prosecutions and agency 
proceedings against banks and use it address a standing question 
respecting the magnitude of the prospective deterrent impact.  We 
show that even though the fines, settlements, and judgments are far 
and away the largest in history and have had an impact on the banks’ 
business plans, it remains an open question whether they there is an 
effective deterrent effect against poorly-grounded risk-taking in the 
financial sector.   
We also highlight substantive and institutional patterns in the 
federal enforcement initiative.  The enforcers addressed the 
origination, securitization, and servicing of subprime mortgages, 
employing classical legal theories, fraud most prominently, and 
disproportionately targeted the six largest banks.  They also largely 
bypassed the machinations in the capital markets that made subprime 
origination and securitization possible.  Restating, federal prosecutors 
are more comfortable targeting transactions between consumers and 
big banks than transactions between big banks and investors.  
Fifth, our Article puts the prevailing regulatory mentality into 
bold relief, bringing out its cautious tendency and free market bias.  
Post-crisis financial regulation rarely uses outright prohibitions.  
Instead, it puts a heavy thumb on the scale to favor certain transactions 
and disfavor other transactions within the banking sector.  It does 
much less to discourage the same transactions by nonbanks and 
generally leaves the capital markets alone and free to innovate.    
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I briefly recounts the 
chain of causes behind the financial crisis and the basic outline of a 
securitization transaction.  This ground has been amply ploughed 
elsewhere, so we present only a concise version of the story.  Part II 
describes the new regulatory landscape, focusing on six sources of 
regulation: (1) constraints on mortgage lending, (2) constraints on 
mortgage servicing (3) disclosure and risk retention requirements 
applied to sponsors of new securitizations, (4) bank capital rules 
applied to investments in securitized debt, (5) accounting rules 
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requiring consolidation of securitization vehicles, and (6) post-crisis 
enforcement initiatives respecting pre-crisis mortgage lending and 
private label securitization and post-crisis mortgage servicing.  Part III 
describes the present state of the key product markets involved in the 
financial crisis:  the residential mortgage market (including agency-
backed issues and the new “nonprime” mortgage product), and the 
securitization market (including CLOs, synthetic securitizations, and 
structured investment vehicles), with a quick look over to the credit 
default swap market.  For each market, the Article shows the impact 
of post-crisis regulation.  Part IV takes stock of post-crisis 
developments across these markets and the impact of post-crisis 
financial market regulation.   A short conclusion follows. 
 
I.   THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, BRIEFLY RECOUNTED 
The financial crisis began with a housing bubble.  A glut of 
cheap financing enabled buyers to bid up home prices across the US 
above fundamental values.6  This cheap financing often came in the 
form of non-traditional mortgage products. More particularly, the 
housing bubble saw a shift in the market’s product mix from 30-year, 
fixed-rate, fully-amortized mortgages to adjustable-rate loans with 
teaser rates, interest-only or negatively amortizing payments, or 
balloon structures.  The new features kept initial monthly payments 
down, enabling borrowers to bid up housing prices.7   
These non-traditional mortgages were frequently made at high 
loan-to-value ratios, further enabling prices to be bid up.  They were 
also frequently not fully documented, which enabled borrowers to 
obtain larger loans based on inflated, stated incomes, which also let 
borrowers bid up home prices.8  At the same time, borrowers with ever 
weaker credit scores became qualified to borrow, resulting in more 
entrants to the home buying market, which once again bid up housing 
prices.9   
 
6 Levitin & Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, supra note 1, at 1182.  
7 Id. at 1196, 1199.  
8 Id. at 1195-96, 1199. 
9 Adam J. Levitin et al., Mortgage Risk Premiums during the Housing Bubble, 59 J. R.E. FIN. & 
ECON. ___ [12] (2019).  
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The surfeit of non-traditional mortgage financing was possible 
only because of a shift in the housing finance channel from regulated 
securitization by the government-sponsored entities (GSEs) Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac to unregulated securitization by private actors.10  
Securitization is the process of producing debt securities the 
repayment of which comes solely from a discrete and segregated pool 
of financial assets rather than from the income of an operating firm, 
income that might be subject to claims of competing contract 
counterparties and non-contractual (tort) creditors or which might 
vary based on management strategies.  This securitization process 
facilitates investment in carefully targeted risks: investors assume the 
risk of the performance of the specified assets and avoid assuming the 
general operational risks of a firm.   
The processes’ particulars can vary form deal to deal.  In the 
prototypical securitization transaction, a “sponsor” firm assembles a 
pool of residential mortgage loans.  The loans might have been made 
by the sponsor and its affiliates or they might be purchased from 
unaffiliated third-parties.  Either way, these original lenders are known 
as “originators,” and are often, but not necessarily, insured depository 
institutions.  The sponsor then transfers the pool of mortgage loans to 
a subsidiary, known as a “depositor,” thereby isolating the mortgages 
from its other assets.  The depositor then sells the mortgages to a 
“special purpose entity” (SPE), typically an owner trust.  The trust 
finances the purchase of the mortgage loans by issuing debt securities 
in the public markets.  The repayment of this debt is backed by the 
SPE’s only asset—the right to collect payments on the mortgage loans.  
Since in this case the assets in the SPE are home mortgages the SPE’s 
securities are called residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).  
The depositor then sells the RMBS (directly, through an underwriting 
affiliate, or through a third-party underwriter) into the bond market.   
The RMBS are liabilities only of the SPE, not of the sponsor 
or depositor, and the only source for repayment on the RMBS are 
collections on the SPE’s holdings of mortgage loans.  Thus do the 
 
10 Levitin & Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, supra note 1, at 1181.  Fannie Mae is 
the Federal National Mortgage Association, and Freddie Mac is the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation. 
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investors in the RMBS take the risks and returns on a discrete pool of 
assets without assuming any of the sponsor’s operational risks.11 
RMBS production was originally the preserve of the GSEs, 
which acted as sponsors and also guarantied investors timely payment 
of principal and interest on the RMBS.  The GSEs only purchased and 
securitized mortgages that met strict underwriting standards and so 
generally excluded non-traditional mortgage products.  In the years 
preceding the financial crisis, however, GSE securitizations lost 
substantial market share to so-called “private-label securitizations” 
undertaken by investment bank sponsors. 12   Private-label 
securitizations had laxer underwriting standards and were the source 
of financing for most non-traditional mortgages, including subprime 
mortgages.   
The hallmark of private-label securitization prior to the 
financial crisis was a senior-subordinate credit tranching structure in 
the securities (PLS) issued by the SPE.13  With tranching, rather than 
all of the PLS having an equal and ratable share of the risks and returns 
on the assets, some PLS would be junior and bear more risk while 
other PLS in an issue would be senior (and possibly AAA-rated) and 
bear less risk.  Tranching thus allowed private-label securitization to 
produce AAA-rated securities out of pools of dodgy mortgages by 
concentrating all of the credit risk on the structure’s subordinated 
tranches. 14   This AAA securitized paper met an enormous global 
demand for top-rated securities, a demand stoked by a limited supply 
of AAA-rated government and corporate debt.15  Indeed, in the years 
prior to 2008, structured offerings made up most of the AAA debt 
stock.16   
 
11 ADAM J. LEVITIN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY:  FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND MODERN 
COMMERCIAL MARKETS 125 (2D ED. 2018).  
12 See Levitin & Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, supra note 1, at 1193, fig. 1.  
13 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 1, at 21.  
14 LEVITIN, SUPRA note 11, at 126.  
15 Ben S. Bernanke et al., International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United 
States, 2003–2007, at 2 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion Paper 
No. 1014, 2011), available at https://bit.ly/2RC3yHq. See also Levitin & Wachter, Explaining the 
Housing Bubble, supra note 1, at 1225. 
16 Id. [Levitin & Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, supra note 1, at 1225.] 
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There was a catch.  The senior tranches of PLS got AAA 
ratings only because the risk of loss on the mortgages in the 
securitization entity fell on the junior, subordinated tranches.17  There 
was a problem finding buyers for this toxic junior byproduct, the sale 
of which was necessary to the economic viability of PLS. 18   The 
solution was resecuritization.  Junior tranches were bundled into new 
securitizations called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  Here, 
instead of residential mortgages being securitized, junior PLS secured 
by pools of mortgages were themselves securitized. CDO repackaging 
meant a corresponding lift in credit ratings—the CDO’s senior 
tranches bootstrapped junior paper into investment grade status.19  In 
some cases, junior tranches of CDOs were themselves further 
resecuritized into CDO2s.     
Securitization manufactured top-rated securities—gold 
standard debt—out of dross mortgages and leaden PLS.  But supply 
was limited by the finite supply of mortgages and did not satisfy global 
demand for top-rated debt securities.  The investment banks met the 
demand with a synthetic version of the CDO that referenced existing 
CDOs without actually resecuritizing any existing debt.  These 
structures conjoined debt interests referenced to CDOs with credit 
default swap (CDS) positions.  They thereby allowed speculators in the 
financial markets to take short positions on portfolios of CDOs.  
Those on the short side of these arrangements did fantastically well 
during the financial crisis; those on the long side were often wiped out.      
Securitization financialized the consumer mortgage market.  A 
wide range of financial institutions invested in PLS and CDOs.  Many 
then used their investment grade PLS and CDO tranches to 
collateralize short-term borrowing in the repurchase (repo) market on 
which many large financial institutions rely for funding.  And it was in 
the repo market that the global financial crisis began when US housing 
prices began to fall in 2006.  There was a downward spiral—housing 
price declines resulted in credit contraction, which further depressed 
home prices because most home purchases are made on credit.   
 
17 See id. at 1227. 
18 Id.  
19 See id. at 1238-39.  
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The second sign of the crisis appeared when warehouse lenders 
to nonbank subprime mortgage originators began to call their lines of 
credit.  These warehouse lines—structured as repos—funded 
mortgage loans during the period between loan origination and the 
completion of the securitization process.20  With their warehouse lines 
pulled, subprime mortgage originators started to fail beginning in 
December 2006. 21   Credit then began to contract more generally, 
causing housing prices to fall farther.  
Structured investment vehicles (SIVs) were the next domino to 
fall.  SIVs were investment entities often, but not necessarily organized 
by banks on an off-balance sheet basis.  They financed themselves by 
issuing medium-term notes and commercial paper.  Bank SIVS 
engaged in a simple duration arbitrage, financing longer-term assets 
with shorter-term liabilities.  Others SIVs, particularly those of 
nonbank securitization sponsors, were used as in-house warehouse 
financing channels supplementing warehouse lines of credit from 
unaffiliated parties.  In the summer of 2007, investor skittishness about 
the mortgage assets made it impossible for the SIVs to roll over their 
debt.  They were forced to go into wind-down.  This further 
constrained the flow of credit to the mortgage market and added to 
the downward pressure on house prices. 
From there the downward spiral spread throughout a highly 
leveraged financial system.  Credit rating agencies began to downgrade 
outstanding PLS in July 2007.22 Because these PLS were widely used as 
collateral for borrowing by financial institutions, the ratings 
downgrades triggered margin calls, which further constrained the 
liquidity of the financial system and added to the downward pressure 
on home prices.  Finally, on September 15, 2008, came the failure of 
Lehman Brothers, a large investment bank that was heavily invested in 
PLS and dependent on repo financing.  Markets, uncertain which firm 
might fail next, froze.    
Notably, the collapse in home prices did not lead to immediate 
large-scale losses on PLS.  As Figure 1 shows, most loss recognition 
on mortgages occurred after the crisis broke in the fall of 2008.  
 
20 David Echeverry et al., Funding Fragility in the Residential-Mortgage Market, Dec. 31, 2016 
at 5-8.  
21 Id.  at 2.   
22 Moody’s, Moody’s Downgrades Subprime First-Lien RMBS, July 10, 2007.   
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Between 2007 through the third quarter of 2008, only $125 billion of 
losses had been recognized on home mortgages—just 11% of the total 
losses recognized between 2007 and 2016, the last year with an elevated 
level of mortgage charge-offs.   
Figure 1.  Home Mortgage Charge-Offs23 
 
The trigger for the crisis was instead the market’s recognition 
of coming losses on home mortgages and derivative instruments—PLS, 
CDOs, and CDS, and the uncertainty about the magnitude and 
allocation of the losses.  It was clear by the fall of 2008 that there were 
going to be massive losses on home mortgages.  But it was not clear 
just how massive those losses would be.  More importantly, perhaps, 
it was not clear where the losses were going to fall because of the 
opacity and interconnectedness of financial markets.   
This uncertainty triggered a market freeze.  Financial 
institutions obtain short-term funding through repos, which were 
frequently collateralized with highly-rated PLS and CDOs because 
these were assets that were assumed to be “safe” and which would 
retain their value.  When the value of repo collateral became uncertain, 
lenders either demanded more collateral or called their repo lines of 
 
23 Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1, Table F.218.  
 
$0 
$10 
$20 
$30 
$40 
$50 
$60 
$70 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
20
13
 
20
14
 
20
15
 
20
16
 
20
17
 
Mo
rtg
age
 Ch
arg
e‐O
ffs 
($ 
bil
.) 
4/26/19] A TALE OF TWO MARKETS 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
13 
credit. 24   The valuation uncertainty affecting all mortgage-related 
exposures put into question the solvency of many highly leveraged 
financial institutions, institutions whose counterparties suddenly 
refused to deal with them.  Moreover, to the extent that a financial 
institution was a lender to firms with large mortgage market exposure, 
its own solvency became questionable due to uncertainty about its 
ability to recover from its borrowers.  Pervasive uncertainty about the 
extent and allocation of mortgage losses meant that no one could be 
sure if a given counterparty was impaired. No one could adequately 
price for the risk in any event.     
The market freeze forced substantial intervention by the 
federal government to give financial institutions the confidence that 
their institutional counterparties would be money good.  The list of 
federal interventions is long and need not be fully catalogued here, but 
it included two main types of interventions:  interventions to support 
individual institutions and interventions to support particular markets.   
In terms of interventions to support individual institutions, the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
into conservatorship, where they each had access to a $100 billion line 
of credit from the Treasury.  The Federal Reserve Board acquired 
certain assets of Bear Stearns to facilitate Bear’s acquisition by 
JPMorgan Chase.25  Insurance giant AIG was bailed out through an 
$85 billion capital injection from Treasury and the Federal Reserve.26  
Auto manufacturers GM and Chrysler both received government 
financing for their bankruptcies.   And the largest banks were all given 
capital injections from the federal government as part of the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program.   
In terms of interventions to support markets, the Treasury 
guaranteed money market mutual funds while the Federal Reserve 
Board initiated programs to support auction rate securities (the Term 
Auction Facility), primary dealers in treasury securities (the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility) and securities lending (the Term Securities 
Lending Facility), and also provided liquidity to the commercial paper 
 
24 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on the Repo, 104 J. 
FIN. ECON. 425 (2012). 
25 See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Credit and Liquidity Programs and 
the Balance Sheet, at https://bit.ly/2TuF6JP.   
26 Id.  
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market (the Commercial Paper Funding Facility), asset-backed 
commercial paper (the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility), money markets (the Money 
Market Investor Funding Facility), and asset-backed securities (the 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility).27  These market-wide 
facilities totaled trillions of dollars in assistance.  
Efforts to assist consumers with mortgage restructuring came 
later.  In February 2009, the federal government commenced two 
mortgage assistance programs—the Home Affordable Modification 
Program, which paid mortgage servicers bounties to restructure loans, 
and the Home Affordable Refinancing Program, which subsidized 
refinancing of underwater mortgages held in Fannie and Freddie 
securitizations.  These programs resulted in only 1.7 million permanent 
mortgage modifications and 3.4 million refinancings (not all of which 
were of underwater mortgages).  Despite this effort more than 7.8 
million foreclosures were completed between 2007 and 2016. 28  
Relative to the heroic exertions undertaken to stabilize capital markets 
and financial institutions, the attention given to assisting distressed 
consumers amounted to an afterthought and an ineffective one at that.  
On the financial side only Lehman Brothers was left out in the cold.  
On the consumer side, even after financial markets had stabilized, 
residential mortgage losses continued to mount with problems in 
mortgage servicing exacerbating the damage by failing to restructure 
loans and flooding the market with properties in foreclosure.   
 
II.  NEW REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS 
Once the dust settled in 2010, the federal government began a 
series of major regulatory reforms of mortgage lending, securitization, 
and financial markets generally.  These reforms began with the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(“Dodd-Frank”), 29  but continued with various implementing 
rulemakings through 2014. Additionally, federal and state agencies 
 
27 See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Credit and Liquidity Programs and 
the Balance Sheet, at https://bit.ly/2DUznYx. [This is a different URL than for note 23.] 
28 CoreLogic, United States Residential Foreclosure Crisis:  Ten Years Later, 4-5 (Mar. 
2017), https://bit.ly/2KIPxoy.  
29 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376. 
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began a raft of enforcement proceedings alleging various wrongs 
committed before and during the financial crisis.  Meanwhile, the 
markets themselves, already organically adjusting to the risks revealed 
by the financial crisis, further adapted to regulation and enforcement.  
This part reviews the regulatory changes.  Part III turns to market 
responses.   
 
A.  Mortgage Lending 
 The financial crisis emerged from problems in mortgage 
lending and continued with problems in mortgage servicing.  The 
legislative centerpiece of the federal response to the problems in the 
mortgage market was the Dodd-Frank Act.30  Dodd-Frank addressed 
the mortgage market in several ways.  
1. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Dodd-Frank restructured the lines of regulatory authority over 
the mortgage market, which had been splintered among nine federal 
agencies and the states.31  Divided authority frustrated attempts to 
 
30 Id. 
31 The lines of authority differed depending by the type of regulatory activity:  rulemaking, 
supervision, and enforcement. For rulemaking, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System had rulemaking authority over the Truth in Lending Act, which included both 
disclosure requirements and substantive term requirements.  The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) had rulemaking authority over the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act, which covered both real estate closings and loan servicing.  HUD further 
exercised rulemaking authority under the Fair Housing Act.  The Federal Trade Commission 
had rulemaking authority over nonbanks for unfair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP), 
while UDAP authority for banks was vested in the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, and the National Credit Union Administration, depending on the type of insured 
depository institution.  Additionally, HUD, the Veterans Agency, and the US Department of 
Agriculture had authority over the rules governing mortgage loans insured or guaranteed by 
FHA, VA, and USDA Rural Development.   On top of this, states all had their own mortgage 
lending laws, some of which were preempted by federal law.   
Supervision and enforcement authority were further splintered and did not align with 
rulemaking authority.  Only insured depository institutions were subject to regular supervision 
by federal regulators:  the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, the OCC, the OTS, and the 
NCUA, depending on institution type.  Nonbank lenders and servicers were subject to state 
supervision.  For enforcement, insured depositories were again subject to enforcement actions 
by their respective federal regulators, as well as state regulators, while nonbanks were subject 
to enforcement by state regulators and the FTC.  For an overview, see Adam J. Levitin, The 
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coordinate regulation and encouraged regulated firms to engage in 
arbitrage between regulatory regimes.32  Dodd-Frank streamlined the 
structure by creating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB), a new, dedicated consumer protection regulator with 
rulemaking authority over the entire mortgage market and supervision 
enforcement authority over all non-banks and the largest insured 
depository institutions (those with over $10 billion in total assets).33  
As a result, opportunities for regulatory arbitrage disappeared.  All 
mortgage lenders and servicers must now play by the same set of rules. 
2. The Ability-to-Repay Requirement and Qualified Mortgage 
Rule 
Dodd-Frank also added a number of new substantive 
regulations.  Most notably, it prohibits lenders from making residential 
mortgage loans without verifying the borrower’s ability to repay the 
loan, including taxes and insurance on the mortgaged property. 34  
Specifically, lenders must now make a “reasonable and good faith 
determination based on verified and documented information that, at 
the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable 
ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, 
insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and 
assessments.” 35  Ability-to-repay must be calculated based on a 
payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan over its term.  Further, 
for adjustable rate mortgages lenders must use the fully-indexed rate, 
rather than a teaser rate, in the ability-to-repay calculation.36   
There is a statutory safe harbor from the ability-to-repay 
 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  An Introduction, 32 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321 
(2013).  
32 Id. at 327-334.   
33 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).  See also 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515 
(supervisory authority over large depositories). 
34 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act at 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 1411, 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693c(a)). 
35 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1).   
36 15 U.S.C. §§ 1639(a)(3), (a)(6), (a)(7).  Violations of ability-to-repay requirement result 
in both public liability and private liability under the Truth in Lending Act.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(a).  
Additionally, a borrower can raise a violation of the ability-to-repay requirement as a limited 
defense to foreclosure without regard for the Truth in Lending Act’s general statute of 
limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(k). 
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requirement for “qualified mortgages” or QM.  For most loans, QM 
status is an irrebuttable presumption of compliance with the ability-to-
repay requirement,37 although for “higher-priced” QMs (priced at 150 
basis points over the prime rate for first liens mortgages and 350 basis 
points over prime for junior liens) the presumption is rebuttable.38    
Per CFPB regulations, a qualified mortgage loan (1) has substantially 
equal periodic payments (other than changes due to an adjustable rate 
resetting); (2) has limits on points and fees; (3) has a maximum 30-year 
term; (4) must be underwritten to the maximum interest rate in its first 
five years; and (5) has a borrower whose income or assets have been 
verified and whose back-end debt-to-income ratio does not exceed 
43%.39  
Requirements (4) and (5) may be satisfied by two “patches.”  
Under the first of these, the qualification requirements are met if the 
loan is eligible for insurance by FHA or guaranty by the VA (the 
“FHA/VA patch”).40  Under the second, the requirements are met if 
the loan is eligible for purchase by the GSEs (the “GSE patch”).41  The 
GSE patch will expire in 2021, however.42  There is also a third patch 
pursuant to a 2018 law that creates an exception to requirements (3)-
(5) for the debt-to-income ratio for mortgages held in portfolio by 
financial institutions with $10 billion or less in total consolidated assets 
(the “portfolio patch”).43  The portfolio patch also allows some balloon 
mortgages, as long as there is no interest-only period, but limits 
prepayment penalties.44  The FHA/VA patch and GSE patch exclude 
jumbo loans, which are ineligible for GSE backup, but jumbo loans 
can still qualify under the portfolio patch.   
The QM rule had a limited impact when it went into effect in 
January 2014.  The market on its own had already abandoned non-
traditional mortgage products and returned to solid underwriting 
 
37 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i). 
38 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(b)(4).   
39 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2).  
40 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(A).  
41 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(B). 
42 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(iii). 
43 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 115-174, 
May 24, 2018, § 101 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(F)). 
44 Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(F)(ii)(I)(bb)).  
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fundamentals, including verification of ability to repay.  The biggest 
effect of the QM rule on mortgage terms seems to have been on 
portfolio lending above 43% DTI.45     Such lending dropped off 
sharply between 2014 and 2018,46 but is likely to rebound somewhat 
given the portfolio patch which went into effect in 2018.    The 
importance of the QM rule, then, is that it locks in the chastened 
market’s dynamics, rather than forcing a change in the market itself.   
The QM rule also affects secondary market dynamics.  It 
encourages lenders to make QM mortgages, but that as a practical 
matter tends to mean loans that utilize the GSE patch, because the 
GSEs will often accept loans with up to 45% DTI.  In other words, 
the QM rule channels conforming mortgage lending into GSE-eligible 
loans.  While there is non-QM lending occurring, the GSE patch 
effectively codifies the GSEs’ dominance of the secondary mortgage 
market by restricting high-DTI loans to the GSEs, making private-
label securitization uncompetitive for such loans.      
3. Other Mortgage Lending Restrictions 
Dodd-Frank included other regulations of primary mortgage 
market.  Two reforms in particular should be noted.  First, Dodd-
Frank prohibited prepayment penalties on non-QM loans and all 
adjustable-rate or higher-cost loans and restricted prepayment 
penalties for other QM loans. 47  The prohibition on prepayment 
penalties discourages the use of mortgages with low initial teaser rates.   
During the bubble years, this feature, when combined with 
prepayment penalties, locked consumers into the post-teaser rate.  The 
removal of the lock-in penalty makes teaser rates unattractive to 
lenders.   
Second, Dodd-Frank required independent property 
appraisals.48 The appraisal independence helps ensure that properties 
are underwritten at realistic loan-to-value ratios, thereby protecting the 
purchasers of the mortgages in the securitization market.    
 
45 Bing Bai et al., Did the QM Rule Make It Harder to Get a Mortgage, Urban Institute, Mar. 
1, 2016, at https://urbn.is/2S7koDo.   
46 Id.  
47 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c)(1)-(3). 
48 15 U.S.C. § 1639h. 
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4. Impact 
The overall effect of the Dodd-Frank reforms of the primary 
mortgage market is to standardize mortgage products:  30-year 
maximum term, full amortization, no prepayment penalties, fully 
underwritten, and fully documented.  DTI has also been standardized 
to some degree with the 43% QM cap for non-GSE/FHA/VA loans.  
Some terms, however, remain non-standardized—adjustable vs. fixed-
rate, terms that are under 30-years, and loan-to-value ratios.   
There is still room for non-standard products in the Dodd-
Frank system as a technical matter.  Yet the regulatory design heavily 
favors standardized products, such that non-standard products will 
likely remain the exception, marginalized to a small percent of the 
market where they are unlikely to present a threat to systemic stability.  
This approach is the hallmark of post-crisis reforms:  rather than 
banning products outright, the reforms simply constrain demand for 
disfavored products.   
It has been suggested that the ATR rules could be relaxed in 
practice by myopic, over-optimistic lenders seeking short-term 
advantage in the context of a housing bubble, the regime’s penalties 
being too weak to check the lenders’ hard-wired behavioral defects.49  
But subsequent studies, inspecting the layers of new regulation more 
closely, counter that the compliance system accompanying the new 
regime is thorough-going enough to import a break.50  Empirical re-
examinations of pre-crisis mortgages confirms the presence of stalwart 
barriers.51  
B.  Regulation X and Mortgage Servicing Reform 
The CFPB undertook a major overhaul of mortgage servicing 
regulations.  The mortgage servicing industry—the business of 
 
49 Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles:  How Mortgage Regulation 
Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe – From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 1610-23 
(2015). 
50 See Patricia A. McCoy & Susan M. Wachter, Why The Ability-to-Repay Rule Is Vital To 
Financial Stability 42-61 (2019) available at . . .  
51 Ioannis Floros & Joshua T. White, Qualified Residential Mortgages and Default Risk, 70 J. 
BANKING & FINANCE 86, 91 (2016). 
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managing mortgage loans—collapsed as delinquencies soared in 2007.  
Mortgage servicing involves two dissimilar lines of business, 
depending on whether loans are performing or non-performing.  
Servicing performing loans is largely ministerial work:  sending out 
billing statements and processing payments. 52   It requires little 
discretion, and therefore does not require a cadre of highly-trained 
personnel and can be heavily automated.53  In contrast, servicing non-
performing loans requires substantial discretion and hands-on 
attention from skilled personnel if there is to be any attempt at loss 
mitigation instead of foreclosure.54 
The residential mortgage servicing industry was built to deal with 
performing loans because default rates were very low prior to the 
collapse of the bubble.55  Accordingly, servicers did not invest in the 
capacity to handle a large volume of non-performing loans.56  They 
bungled the job as a result, with increased losses for mortgage investors 
and  unnecessary foreclosures which in turn exacerbated the 
downward spiral in home prices.  In addition, incompetence and 
corner-cutting regarding recordkeeping meant that some homeowners 
lost their homes without appropriate legal process or were charged 
inappropriate fees.57   
In 2013, the CFPB announced new servicing regulations, known 
as Reg X.  Reg X prohibits servicers from commencing a foreclosure 
until a loan is at least 120 days delinquent 58  and mandates early 
intervention59 and continuity of contact with borrowers.60  Reg X also 
 
52 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 1, at 4, 28.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See id. at 4, 29.  
56 Id.  
57 DAVID DAYAN, CHAIN OF TITLE:  HOW THREE ORDINARY AMERICANS UNCOVERED 
WALL STREET’S GREAT FORECLOSURE FRAUD (2016); Hearing Before the House Financial 
Services Committee Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, “Robo-
Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing,” Nov. 18, 
2010 (testimony of Adam J. Levitin).   For example, Wells Fargo was sanctioned by a federal 
bankruptcy judge for charging collateral inspection fees on a property that was literally 
underwater and in an evacuation zone in New Orleans following a hurricane.  See In re Stewart, 
391 B.R. 327, 355 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2008). 
58 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1)(i).  
59 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39.  
60 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40. 
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requires a particular loss mitigation eligibility evaluation procedure and 
appeals process if the servicer offers any sort of loss mitigation 
options; no loss mitigation is required, however.61  The servicing rules 
also limit servicers’ ability to profit from forced placements  of 
insurance on delinquent mortgaged properties with affiliates at above-
market rates.62   
While the servicing regulations provide needed protection for 
consumers, they also add to the cost of managing delinquent loans.  
Servicing fees are the same for both performing and delinquent loans,63 
which means they are too high for performing loans and too low for 
delinquent loans.   The additional costs of servicing delinquent loans 
and the reduced opportunities to profit from distressed borrowers may 
have the effect of making lenders with servicing affiliates reluctant to 
extend credit to higher risk borrowers.  The precise impact of the 
servicing regulations cannot be determined, but it likely has a similar 
effect to the QM regulation, which is to limit credit on the margins to 
riskier borrowers.   
C.  Securitization 
Federal post-crisis reforms also include a two-sided 
intervention in the market for asset-backed securities.  First, under 
Dodd-Frank, securitization sponsors must generally retain a 5% stake 
in their products.  Second, the SEC has overhauled, extended, and 
toughened the disclosure requirements attending securitized issues.   
1.  Risk Retention 
Dodd-Frank imposes a risk-retention requirement for all types of 
asset securitizations, including mortgage securitizations, known as the 
“skin-in-the-game” requirement.64 Under regulations promulgated by 
a consortium of federal financial regulators, securitizers must retain 5% 
of the credit risk on asset securitizations, unless an exemption applies. 
Securitizations undertaken by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac inherently 
meet the risk retention requirement because Fannie and Freddie hold 
 
61 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a).   
62 See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.37.   
63 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 1, at 35-39.  
64 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act at 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 941, 124 Stat. at 1890 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11). 
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all the credit risk in their securitizations through their guaranties 
(although some is swapped out in back-end transactions).65  Thus, as a 
practical matter the risk-retention requirement only applies to private-
label securitizations.   
The skin-in-the-game requirement is based on the idea that 
securitization creates a moral hazard problem—securitizers know 
more about the assets they are securitizing than investors and will 
therefore attempt to pawn off “lemons” on investors.  Requiring 
securitizers to retain some of the risk on the assets that they are 
securitizing—making them eat their own cooking—should ensure 
better quality assets in securitizations, which will, in turn, cut off the 
financing for shoddily underwritten loans.  By assuring investors that 
a party with superior information is willing to assume the same or 
similar risks, retention is supposed to have a bonding function.66 
The scholarly evidence on moral hazard in securitization is 
mixed.67  But even if securitization has a serious moral hazard problem, 
risk retention does not provide a complete solution.  The retention 
requirement does ameliorate information asymmetries between 
securitizers and investors.  But it does not assure that originators have 
the ability to engage in good underwriting in the first place.  Moreover, 
investors may have no way to determine a given originator’s 
competence as regards mortgage risk evaluation.  If the originator is a 
monoline nonbank, its financial statements could provide assistance, 
 
65 See 12 C.F.R. § 1234.8.   
66 The securitizer may also, separately, make representations and warranties to investors 
about the quality of the securitized assets. Such representations and warranties are contractual 
and not mandated by law. They are also not a guarantee of the loans’ performance, only a 
statement of facts about the loans upon which investors can rely. Representation and 
warranties in securitization have historically involved lengthy litigation and are only valuable 
to the extent the securitizer is solvent; if there are too many representation and warranty 
violations, the securitizer may not have the assets to repay them all. Thus, representations and 
warranties are protection against fraudulent underwriting, but only on a limited scale. 
67 Cf. Benjamin Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime 
Loans, 125 Q. J. ECON. 307 (2010)(arguing that credit score cutoff rules indicate that 
securitization is associated with moral hazard) and Beltran, supra note 1 (finding higher losses 
on CDOs arranged by vertically integrated banks, which had an informational advantage and 
could better identify lemons, than those arranged by non-integrated banks) with Ryan Bubb & 
Alex Kaufman, Securitization and Moral Hazard:  Evidence from Credit Score Cutoff Rules, 63 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 1 (2014) (arguing that credit score cutoff rules do not supply evidence for 
moral hazard in securitization because they applied to originators without regard to whether 
loans would be securitized).    
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given a track record.  But if, as is likely, it is a nonbank of recent origin 
a track record is only a future possibility.  If the originator is a bank, 
there likely is a track record.  Unfortunately, however, its financial 
reports present a composite picture of overall performance (or often 
of parent financial conglomerate’s overall performance). The 
performance of the bank’s securitizations is just one factor out of many 
and may be overshadowed by the performance of the bank’s other 
assets.  Thus, a bank might be a poor judge of credit risk on mortgages 
but still be quite profitable overall. Indeed, the opacity of bank balance 
sheets 68  mutes market discipline, and for larger banks, market 
discipline is further muted because of the moral hazard of investing in 
a too-big-to-fail financial institution.  Finally, if the bank is willing to 
“bet” big on mortgages, whose long-term performance is risky for the 
purpose of booking short-run gains, a “tax” on those short-run gains 
in the form of a requirement to hold some of the long-term risk in-
house will not matter. 
  The risk retention requirement does not apply to securitizations 
of certain asset classes, the most important of which are “qualified 
residential mortgages” (QRMs), a term left to definition by 
implementing regulation.69  Federal regulators have defined QRM to 
mean qualified mortgage (QM) as defined by the CFPB under the 
ability-to-repay requirements.70  In other words, risk retention applies 
only to securitization of non-QM mortgages.  There is no risk retention 
requirement for QM-mortgage securitizations. It follows that even as 
non-QM mortgages still may be securitized, an additional cost is 
incurred because the sponsor must retain part of the deal.  The effect 
of this is further to herd the market into making only QM loans, but 
without directly prohibiting non-QM lending.   
 Notably, neither the QRM rule nor QM rule addresses loan-to-
value (LTV) ratios on residential mortgage loans.  The original 
proposed QRM rule had an 80% loan-to-value (LTV) limit for 
 
68 For an empirical discussion of bank opacity and its impact on the ratings of bank-
issued securities, see Giuliano Iannotta, Testing for Opaqueness in the European Banking Industry: 
Evidence from Bond Credit Ratings (SDA Bocconi, Working Paper No. 122/04, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=570483.  
69 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4)(B).  
70 12 C.F.R. § 1234.13(a).  
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residential mortgages,71 but there is no LTV limit in the final rule.  The 
lack of post-crisis LTV regulation is surprising because of the 
important role that high LTV lending played in the financial crisis.  All 
else being equal, default rates and losses given default are higher on 
high LTV mortgages.72  High LTV mortgages enabled borrowers to 
bid up housing prices in the first place and increased investor losses.  
Yet nothing today prevents or even discourages a lender from making 
or securitizing a high LTV residential mortgage loan.  
2.  Disclosure: Regulation AB II 
The other major reform of securitization markets is a revision 
of the disclosure requirements for securities investors.  The regulation 
governing securitization disclosures to investors is known as Reg AB.  
In 2014, the SEC finalized a revision to Regulation AB, known as Reg 
AB II, which requires issuers of asset-backed securities, including PLS, 
to provide standardized loan-level information in the prospectus and 
ongoing reports.  For residential mortgage securitizations this includes 
disclosure of 272 separate loan-level items.73   
Previously, Reg AB (“Reg AB I”) had required disclosure of 
only that the “material terms” of the assets, as well as disclosure of the 
underwriting criteria, the identity of any originator of over 10% of 
assets, the selection criteria for the asset pool, and the cut-off date for 
establishing the asset pool.74  Disclosures were not standardized—
what was deemed “material” differed by securitization sponsor.  
Moreover, disclosures were made on a pool level basis and stated in 
averages (and potentially maximums and minimums) for a limited 
number of loan characteristics. For example, a pool might be disclosed 
to have a weighted average FICO score of 700, which could be 1,000 
loans all with 700 FICOs or 500 loans with 750 FICOs and 500 loans 
with 650 FICOs.  Those are materially different pools, but the 
 
71 76 Fed. Reg. 24089, 24166-24167, Apr. 29, 2011 (proposed § ___.15(c)(9)).  
72 Kris Gerardi, GSE Mortgage Insurance Pricing, presentation at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, Apr. 27, 2017, at 11 (on file with the authors) (showing 5-year cumulative 
default rate ratios by LTV for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac single-family, owner-occupied 
fixed-rate mortgages originated between 2000 and 2011).   
73 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1111(h)(1), 229.1125. 
74 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1110, 1111(a)-(b) (2006).  
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difference would not be apparent from the original Reg AB I 
disclosures.  
Reg AB II’s loan-level disclosures make it possible to see the 
interactions of numerous characteristics and thus gives investors a 
much clearer picture of the risk involved in a loan pool.  Moreover, the 
Reg AB II loan-level disclosures must be provided to the SEC in XML 
format,75 so they are readily downloaded and useable by investors.  
Previously, non-standard formatting of disclosures in prospectus 
supplements required hand collection.  
Reg AB II also includes a provision designed to ensure that 
investors have adequate time to analyze securitization deals prior to 
investing.  It does so by mandating a delay between disclosure of the 
terms of the deals and sale as a condition to eligibility for shelf 
registration.76  Under the previous regime, the prospectus supplement 
merely had to be provided to buyers at the time of sale, and to the SEC 
two business days later. 77   Reg AB II mandates disclosure of the 
prospectus supplement at least three business days before the first sale, 
and also requires a 48-hour delay on pricing after any material change.78  
The delay gives investors a chance to digest the information on the 
underlying collateral in the prospectus supplement.   
Reg AB II also conditions shelf registration on inclusion of a 
set of investor protections regarding “putbacks” in the wake of false 
representations.   All securitizations include sets of representations and 
warranties regarding the securitized assets.  In theory, these give 
investors confidence in what they are buying.  If the assets back a 
securitized loan are not as represented, the loan can be “put back” to 
the sponsor through a repurchase process.  The putback process is 
meant to be self-executing, and assumes that all parties will act in good 
faith.   
 
75 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1111(h)(2), 232.11, 232.301.  
76 79 Fed. Reg. 57184, 57259 (Sept. 24, 2014).  Shelf registration allows repeated issuances 
of securities under the same issuance program.  Specifically, it allows securities to be registered 
in advance with a generic form base prospectus in advance and then, when, market conditions 
for a securities issuance are favorable, the issuer can then take the securities down “off the 
shelf” and quickly sell them without subsequent SEC staff review through a “prospectus 
supplement” that contains more specific information about the particular securities being 
offered.   
77 75 Fed. Reg. 23328, 23334 (May 3, 2010).  
78 17 C.F.R. § 230.424(h).  
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Post-crisis, however, parties faced with a large volume of 
potential putbacks did not always act in good faith.  Securitization 
servicers, the parties positioned to enforce the putbacks in the first 
instance, proved reluctant to enforce them because of affiliations with 
the sponsors.    Securitization trustees also proved reluctant.  They got 
no additional compensation for the time and effort spent on putback 
enforcement and relied on the sponsors rather than the investors for 
deal flow.  They had a special disincentive when it came to pushing 
servicers, for if the servicer were fired the trustee would be responsible 
for the servicing.   Moreover, when putback actions were brought, they 
were often contested by sponsors.   Bank of America CEO Brian 
Moynihan stated that his bank would fight putbacks “hand-to-hand.”79   
Reg AB II attempts to address these problems by  making shelf 
registration eligibility contingent upon a securitization transaction 
having four terms.80  First, the securitization must have a certification 
by the CEO of the depositor (the entity that transfers the loans to the 
securitization entity) that the prospectus information is correct and 
that the deal should be able to generate the cash flows to pay all of the 
securities in full.81  The certification provision puts more teeth into the 
representations and warranties; a violation of representations and 
warranties is now a securities law violation, not merely a contractual 
violation with remedies limited to putbacks.  Second, the transaction 
must provide that if defaults hit a specified level, an investor vote may 
be triggered upon the request of no more than 5% of the total interest 
in the pool.82  If that vote is affirmative, there will be an independent 
investigation of possible representation and warranty violations on at 
least all loans that are 60+ days delinquent.  Based on the findings of 
the investigation, the trustee must then decide whether to pursue 
putbacks, and the trustee must provide investors with a summary of 
any report provided to investors.  This process removes the putback 
decision from the hands of the servicer, although it still allows the 
trustee substantial control over the scope of the review and the process 
by which votes are solicited.  Third, the transaction must allow the 
party bringing the putback request to seek arbitration or mediation at 
 
79 Jonathan R. Laing, Banks Face Another Mortgage Crisis, FORBES, Nov. 20, 2010.   
80 17 C.F.R. § 239.45(b). 
81 17 C.F.R. § 239.45(b)(1)(i)  
82 17 C.F.R. § 239.45(b)(1)(ii)(C).   
 
4/26/19] A TALE OF TWO MARKETS 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
27 
its option if the dispute is not resolved within 180 days.83  This drops 
the assumption that putback requests will lead to good faith informal 
resolution and inserts a cost-effective resolution mechanism.  And 
finally, trustees are required to disclose all investor requests to 
communicate with each other, which facilitates surmounting collective 
action thresholds for investors to demand that the securitization 
trustee take action.84   
 Reg AB II’s bite is limited because it applies only to offerings 
of registered securities.  The post-crisis PLS market has now largely 
shifted to private placements, all of which are exempt from Reg AB II.  
Synthetic securitizations and derivative credit-risk transfers also remain 
exempt from registration, along with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
Ginnie Mae securitizations.85  Thus, the Reg AB II fixes apply to only 
a very small part of the current mortgage market.  Given the changes 
in the mortgage market, including the relative decline of PLS issues,86 
Reg AB II looks like a weapon for the last war, a solution to a problem 
already addressed through migrations in the market.   
D.  Bank Capital 
Banks are required to maintain minimum equity cushions.  The 
rules are elaborate, but the gist can be explained readily.  The rule sets 
a base line of 8 cents of equity for every dollar of assets and then goes 
on to temper the 8% requirement by applying different “risk weights” 
to different assets.  A treasury bond, for example, is riskless, carries a 
risk weight of zero, and as a result does not have to be supported by 
equity capital.  A corporate loan, in contrast, carries a risk weight of 
100% and therefore must be supported by the full 8% dose.  Generally, 
the lower the percentage of equity capital required to support the 
bank’s balance sheet, the higher the return to the bank’s shareholders. 
Prior to the financial crisis, the risk-weighting system made 
investment in CDOs very attractive to bank portfolio managers.  
Credit ratings drove the risk-weights in those days—the higher the 
 
83 17 C.F.R. § 239.45(b)(1)(iii).  
84 17 C.F.R. § 229.1121(e).  
85  12 U.S.C. §§ 1455g (Fannie Mae); 1723c (Freddie Mac); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2), 
78c(a)(12) (Ginnie Mae).  
86 See infra text accompanying notes 184-186. 
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rating, the lower the amount of equity capital required to support the 
investment, and the higher the rate of return to the bank.  Because the 
ratings agencies rated CDOs highly (too highly as it turned out), many 
banks accumulated large portfolios of them.87   
Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act requires the elimination 
of regulatory reliance on credit ratings and the substitution of other 
measures of creditworthiness.88  The section accordingly triggered an 
overhaul of bank capital rules.89 New methodologies for assessing the 
riskiness of securitized paper were devised and specified.  Risk weights 
applied to securitized assets also were revised upward.   
Under the new rules, speaking generally, a bank must support 
securitization exposures with more equity capital than would be 
required to hold the asset directly.   A 2017 Report of the Treasury 
Department charges that the rules “overly burden activity in 
securitized products.”90  One can argue with the “overly,” but the 
“burden” characterization is fair.  
Each bank is charged with the responsibility to conduct a risk 
appraisal of every one of its securitization exposures.91  Absent an 
appraisal, a risk rating of 1250% (implying 100% equity capitalization) 
applies automatically.   100% equity capitalization means that the bank 
must have $1 of equity for every $1 of the amount of the asset that it 
keeps on its books; a $100 million asset would require $100 million of 
 
87 See Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage 
Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539 
(2015) (listing the top 20 securitizers and comparing their investment portfolios). 
88 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act at 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 939A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887. 
89 U.S. Department of the Treasury, A Financial System That Creates Economic Opportunities 
Capital Markets: Report to President Donald J. Trump 96 (2017) [hereinafter Treasury Report].  The 
Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation issued the “Final Rules” in 2013.  See Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory 
Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, 
Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, 
Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62017, 
62120 (Oct. 11, 2013). 
90 Treasury Report, supra note 89, at 96.   
91 The big banks are required to generate risk weighting methodologies internally; smaller 
banks are provided with an off-the-rack risk assessment methodology.  See Treasury Report, 
supra note 89, at 97-98; Black Swan Consulting, Basel III Risk-Based Regulatory Capital Framework 
for Securitization Exposures 3-4, 6 (Feb. 10, 2105).   
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equity supporting it.  If an appraisal is done, the risk-rating can go as 
low as 20% (which implies equity capital support of 1.6%) but no 
lower, no matter how safe the security.  Prior to the financial crisis, the 
floor was 7%.92   
The appraisal methodology takes into account the risk 
weighting and historical performance of the securitization’s underlying 
assets, the particular exposure’s place in the ladder of tranches, and 
whether or not the exposure is a resecuritization. The calculative 
results can change over time based on the asset’s performance.   
The risk calculation begins with the risk characteristics of 
assets in the SPE.  Adjustments are then made for the different 
tranches—the most junior tranches ratchet right up to a 1250% rating; 
ratings of senior tranches can go lower than the rating applied to the 
underlying asset.93 In addition, an automatic surcharge (the p factor) of 
50% of the risk weighting of the underlying asset gets worked into the 
calculation.  There is no reduction for credit enhancements.  
Furthermore, if there is a single resecuritized asset in the SPE, the 
surcharge is 150 percent.94   In other words, from the point of view of 
bank capital planning, the capital charge is lower when mortgages and 
debt securities are held directly; investment in a CDO now no longer 
makes any sense.   
Disadvantages regarding securitization exposures also crop up 
at other points in the safety and soundness regulatory landscape.  
Under the Federal Reserve Board’s stress testing regime, for example, 
the negative shock against which securitization holdings are tested is 
pegged to price levels recorded at the depth of the financial crisis.95  
The Basel III liquidity standards make for a second example when they 
deem private label securitization paper to be per se illiquid.96    
Return now to the Dodd Frank risk retention rules for non-
QRM securitizations.  One sees quickly why the banks view them with 
 
92 Global Legal Group, The International Comparative Guide to Securitization 26 (10th ed. 
2017).  
93 Id. at 3-4. 
94 For a calculative exemplar, see id. at 7. 
95 Treasury Report, supra note 89, at 99. 
96 Id. at 100-101.  See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 
79 Fed. Reg. 61440 (Oct. 10, 2014); Morrison & Foerster, Securitisation: Risk Weightings and Risk 
Retention: Approaches in the EU and the US 60-61 (2015). 
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distaste.  It is not that the banks object to being required to leave “skin 
in the game.”   Instead, it is the skin-in-the-game’s implications for 
their regulatory capital.  A horizontal first-loss tranche carries a 
punitive 100% equity capital charge.  Retention of a vertical slice avoids 
this problem, and, indeed, can be treated as a direct exposure to the 
underlying asset, escaping the punitive capital add-ons resulting from 
application of the new calculus.  But the bank’s view of securitization 
exposure is still fundamentally altered because the economics of 
origination favor horizontal first-loss tranche retention. 
Add all of this up and investment by a bank in any structured 
product other an agency-backed RMBS is affirmatively discouraged, 
not only by the equity capital charge but by the added expense of 
calculating the risk weight.    
E.  Accounting 
Structured finance posed a serious question for accounting 
standard setters: Should the SPE (and its debt obligations) be 
consolidated with the originator’s balance sheet?   The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) originally said no—the SPE debt 
could be incurred off-balance sheet provided that the asset transfer 
was a “true sale” and an unaffiliated party held a small sliver of the 
SPE’s junior-most tranche.  It followed that a bank sponsor of a PLS 
deal could get off-balance sheet treatment even as it retained the right 
to service the mortgages being transferred to the SPE and 
simultaneously retained 90 percent of the structure’s junior tranche.97  
Under this approach, the “true sale” that is the legal cornerstone of 
securitization had form without substance,  for the seller retained the 
power to manage the asset and both the upside and downside risk of a 
change in its value.    
Revised standards went into effect in 2010.98   Under these, a 
securitization vehicle is classified as a “variable interest entity” (VIE), 
 
97 See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 414-16 (8th 
edition 2016).  
98 See FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 167, 
AMENDMENTS TO FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46(R), June 2009, which descended from 
FASB Staff Position, FIN 46(R)-5; Mar. 3, 2005.  The rules are now located in ASC 810, 
Consolidation.  They were heavily revised in February 2015.  See Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, Accounting Standards Update (ASU) No. 2015-02, Amendments to the 
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which is defined as an entity that either has no equity investors or 
whose equity investors do not control the business in their capacity as 
equity investors.  A party must consolidate a VIE if it has both the 
power to direct the activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s 
economic performance and either an obligation to assume to the VIE’s 
losses or the right to receive benefits that could potentially be 
significant to the VIE.99  Under this standard, an originator retaining 
servicing rights and holding on to the junior tranche must consolidate 
the securitization entity.  Contrariwise, the securitization is off-balance 
sheet if the servicing is contracted out to a third party and the 
originator does not retain the junior tranche.  
Consolidation conceivably can result solely as a function of 
servicing rights retention.  To see why, consider the servicing of an 
RMBS.  The servicer has the power to foreclose a mortgage in the 
SPE’s asset pool in the event it defaults and the power to enter into an 
agreement that cures the default by modifying the mortgagor’s 
obligations.  These are “significant activities” that meet the first leg of 
the VIE test.  The second, financial leg of the test can be triggered 
when servicing rights also entail financial risk.  This is not uncommon.  
For example, servicers in Ginnie Mae guaranteed securitizations are 
required to take a loss position junior to that of the agency guarantor.  
Such a guaranty satisfies the financial test and the originator thus will 
have to include the RMBS debt on its balance sheet.100  Alternatively, 
if the compensation received for servicing is greater than what an arm’s 
length third party would charge to perform the same administrative 
task, then potentially significant economic benefits also being 
received,101 meeting the second leg of the test.    
These rules pose a trade-off to an originating bank: taking 
maximum financial advantage of a securitization now means doing the 
deal on balance sheet; keeping the deal (and its debt) off balance sheet 
means limiting the bank’s continuing financial interest in (and potential 
returns on) the assets.  Restating, true sale now means what it says.  
 
Consolidation Guidance.  
99 DELOITTE, SECURITIZATION ACCOUNTING 7 (10th ed. 2017). 
100 Id. at 52. 
101 Id. at 51. 
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Banks are resolving the trade-off in favor of off-balance sheet 
treatment, as a look at a few big bank financial statements readily 
confirms.102  The choice is not just a function of  management of the  
balance sheet’s appearance.  Consolidation has a knock-on effect under 
the bank capital rules and raises total equity capital required to support 
the balance sheet, lowering returns to the shareholders.103  
F.  Enforcement 
1.  Prosecution as a Regulatory Alternative   
Although the Dodd-Frank Act does many things, it does not 
impose an ex post penalty for causing a financial crisis by taking and 
externalizing excessive risks.  Such a mode of regulation is off-limits.  
Even assuming such a penalty could have a cost-beneficial deterrent 
effect, the definition of “excessive (but unregulated) risk” presents an 
insurmountable hurdle for the drafter.  An empowered regulator 
conceivably could perform the backstop function of monitoring and 
checking excessive risk-taking in unregulated space—it would have to 
be an uncaptured agency with discretionary enforcement powers so 
great as to impose a conservative mind-set on the entire financial sector 
by informal means.  Some think that federal regulators had that kind 
of prestige and influence in the post-New Deal era.104  But any such 
power waned a long time ago.105  Regulators now bear the burden to 
specify and justify new constraints. Companies treat regulators as 
adversaries without fear of reprisal.    
But the system has discovered ways to compensate, extracting 
compensatory and punitive give-backs from companies that otherwise 
 
102  See, e.g., Bank of America Corporation, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended 
December 31, 2017 at 140-44, available at https://bit.ly/2RAaVz4 (showing that all credit card 
receivable securitizations are consolidated but relatively little of other types).  JP Morgan Chase 
reported $182.763 billion of securitized real estate, of which only 2% was consolidated.  Its 
total consolidated securitizations amounted to $73.1 billion, of which 89% was made of credit 
card receivables and multi-seller conduits.  JP Morgan Chase & Co., Form 10-K for the Fiscal 
Year ended December 31, 2017, at 237, 241 available at https://bit.ly/2MOxAa5.  
103 See 12 C.F.R. § 217.2. Significantly, a 2017 Treasury Department report that laid out 
a long deregulatory wish list for companies in the financial sector, singled out this constraint. 
Treasury Report, supra note 89, at 98. 
104 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf 
Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 135-43 (2008). 
105 William W. Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law from Social Welfare, 74 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 767 (2017). 
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benefit from the rollback of the big stick state.  One such adjustment 
is tied to the rise of “compliance” as an independent regulatory 
concern.  Even as companies are free to fight regulators tooth and nail 
in warding off new regulation, failures to comply with existing 
regulation are treated with increasing seriousness.  The trend first 
showed itself when mandated internal compliance systems appeared in 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.106 Such mandates now 
apply across the board.    
Public enforcement, including criminal prosecution, is the 
other give-back.  When a company’s compliance system breaks down 
and the company falls into shabby practices, takes excessive risks, and 
externalizes financial losses, it can fall to prosecutors to devise 
violations (criminal or civil) of open-ended statutory prohibitions 
against corruption.  The Arthur Andersen accounting firm was the pre-
crisis exemplar of this: it collapsed in 2002 after losing the first round 
of a post-Enron criminal prosecution.107  The Supreme Court’s later 
rejection of the prosecutors’ broad reading of the statute underlying 
the indictment108 vindicated the firm’s legal position but did not bring 
the firm back.109  Arthur Andersen was effectively a backdoor return to 
the disused common law remedy of quo warranto dissolution of a 
miscreant company by the state’s attorney general,110 wielded not by an 
official in the state of incorporation but by a U.S. attorney.  
The financial crisis had no Arthur Andersen, however: “too big 
to fail” (TBTF) has that effect.  Nor did the crisis result in widespread 
criminal prosecution of individual miscreants—the Jeff Skillings and 
Andy Fastows of the banks responsible.111 The crisis did, however, 
 
106 15 U.S.C. § 77dd. 
107  See, e.g., N. Craig Smith & Michelle Quirk, Fall From Disgrace: The Rise and Fall of Arthur 
Andersen, 1 J. BUS. ETHICS & EDU. 91 (2004). 
108 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).  
109 Former Andersen partners bought the name in 2014 and changed the name of their 
San Francisco firm to “Andersen Tax.”  See James Titcomb, Arthur Andersen Returns 12 
Years after Enron Scandal, Telegraph, Sept, 2 2014 available at 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11069713/Arthur-
Andersen-returns-12-years-after-Enron-scandal.html. 
110 State attorneys general still have the power to seek dissolution.  See, e.g., Del. Corp. L. 
§ 284(a). But the remedy no longer figures importantly in business regulation.   
111 To wit, Angelo Mozillo of Countrywide or Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman.  For a cogent 
explanation as to why no prosecutions occurred, see David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 
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trigger a civil enforcement initiative of unprecedented magnitude by 
federal and state regulatory agencies and prosecutors.   The trick lay 
not only in the shift of framework but in the timing.  TBTF meant that 
punitive retaliation had to be delayed until the banks were strong 
enough to withstand it.112  Thus, billion-dollar settlements related to 
events that occurred in years prior to 2008 began to occur only in 2012, 
after the banks were on more solid financial footing. 
The post-crisis enforcement push was so big as arguably to add 
an ex post deterrent to the front line of formal rules and regulations 
that constrain excessive risk taking.  On this view of the world, 
banking, commodities, and securities law are now backstopped by an 
implicit threat: When an institution exploits loopholes to take excessive 
risks and then externalizes the negative effects of the resulting losses 
on the rest of the economy, federal regulators and prosecutors will 
extract a significant financial penalty afterwards. TBTF status does not 
import an exemption because the enforcers wait until the crisis is past 
and the institution is out of danger before going forward.   
The threat has a substantive kicker: there is no requirement of 
a well-tested legal theory.  Andersen was an outlier in more ways than 
one: prosecutorial concoctions from open-ended statutory 
prohibitions are rarely tested in court because risk-averse institutions 
tend to settle, even in civil enforcement contexts where no 
“conviction” will be forthcoming.  The enforcers who bring such 
proceedings wield pre-emptive power that primary financial and other 
regulators no longer possess.  The same company that defends stoutly 
and uncooperatively in civil regulatory contexts,113 treats an indictment 
with utmost risk aversion, making a quick deal.  
At the same time, even as there is a new threat, its magnitude 
and parameters are not clear.  The threat is not defined by a range of 
fines stated in an ex ante regulation, although the fines are subject to 
 
100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1437-45 (2014)(describing the government as shy of the level of 
difficulty, worried about unintended effects and overconfident about the impact of civil 
enforcement).  The closest exception came with FDIC civil initiative against individual in 
charge of the failed S&Ls, WaMu and IndyMac.  Id. at 1461-64. 
112 Cf. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, supra note 3, at 510-13 (proposing structuring bailouts 
as force-placed loans that are only to be repaid after crisis has passed).    
113 See Romano, Further Assessment of the Iron law of Financial Regulation, supra note 5, at 2 
(suggesting that notorious delays in the implementation of Dodd-Frank provisions was due to 
intense lobbying by the affected parties). 
4/26/19] A TALE OF TWO MARKETS 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
35 
an implicit cap—we will not be seeing numbers so large as to impair a 
bank’s soundness and destabilize the financial system; there is no 
“death penalty” post-Arthur Andersen.  Thus contained, the threat’s 
more particular magnitude follows from a projection of future 
enforcement behavior.  One estimates a price tag by reference to the 
prosecutors’ past track record, and then discounts the number not only 
for time but for political economic vagaries.   
2.  Post-Crisis Enforcement Initiatives   
How much of a threat have the post-crisis enforcers left 
behind?  To get a picture of the enforcement initiative’s scope and 
magnitude we selected a sample of large banks, comprised of the 20 
largest domestic bank holding companies with institutional continuity 
extending back to 2000.114  The banks on the list as a practical matter 
fall into two groups.  The biggest six—JP Morgan Chase, Bank of 
America, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley 
(the “Top Six”)—are universal banks incorporating global investment 
banks.  The remaining fourteen are very large commercial banks 
without global investment banking reach—U.S. Bancorp, PNC 
Financial Services, Bank of NY Mellon, Capital One Financial, State 
Street, BB&T, Charles Schwab, SunTrust Banks, American Express, 
Fifth Third Bancorp, KeyCorp, Northern Trust, Regions Financial, 
 
114 This process began with the Office of Financial Research’s 2017 list of the largest U.S. 
bank holding companies and intermediate holding companies, available at www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/P211117-1.pdf. The intermediate holding companies are U.S. 
establishments of large foreign banks.  They were dropped on the theory that ceteris paribus a 
branch of a foreign bank might make more attractive enforcement target for a U.S. prosecutor 
than a domestic bank.  The omitted banks are TD Group US, HSBC North America, Credit 
Suisse US, Deutsche Bank Trust, Barclays US, MUFG Americas Holdings, RBC US, UBS 
Americas, BNP, Santander Holdings USA, and BMO Financial.  Two additional banks from 
the remaining top 20 on the ground we dropped on the ground that they lacked comparability 
from an enforcement point of view due to changes in their institutional profiles between 2000 
and 2018.  One, Ally Financial, formerly was General Motors Acceptance Corporation and 
emerged from bankruptcy as an independent bank.  The other, Citizens Financial, was the 
domestic arm of The Royal Bank of Scotland until 2014.   
We did the same statistical workup on the intermediate holding companies that we did 
for the domestic banks.  They break down into two groups that resemble the breakdown of 
the domestic banks.  One group, comprised of HSBC, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and 
Barclays was swept up in the Task Force enforcement effort and paid significant fines.  A 
second and partially overlapping group of four, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, UBS, and BNP paid 
significant fines in connection with enforcement actions relating to the LIBOR rate fixing 
scandal.  Otherwise the picture resembles that of the domestic Second Group. 
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and M&T Bank (the “Second Group”).  We collected data on all fines 
and damage settlements incurred in connection with federal 
enforcement actions against each bank holding company and all 
constituent companies from 2000 to June 5, 2018.115 
Some bold patterns emerge.  A look at the bottom line of 
Table 1116 shows that 96.7% of fines and damages incurred date from 
2009 and thereafter, strongly implying a concerted and broad-based 
enforcement response to the crisis.  Enforcement activity increased 
almost across-the-board, sweeping in anti-discrimination, foreign 
trade, and antitrust regulation in addition to subject matters related to 
the financial crisis.  The only categories in which incurrence slacked 
off after 2008, in the sense that less than 85% percent of activity 
occurred thereafter, were securities and commodities regulation and 
labor law.117  
Table 1’s categorical breakdown adds detail to the picture.  
Crisis-related subject-matter looms overwhelmingly after 2008.  A total 
of 83.7% of all fines and damages incurred during the period 2000-
2018 fall into the “mortgage and securitization” category and 
concerned either (1) securitization in the consumer real estate sector, 
in particular defalcations connected to the origination and packaging 
of mortgages into RMBS; and (2) the servicing of defaulted mortgages 
during and after the financial crisis.  This is an enforcement category 
that for all intents and purposes did not exist before the financial crisis: 
99.9% of the fines in the category were incurred beginning in 2009.    
A few more situation-specific, but non-exclusive reasons for 
the shift in enforcement should be mentioned.  First, politics might 
have played a role.  A new Democratic administration came into office 
in 2009, an administration presumptively more inclined toward 
enforcement initiatives than either its Republican predecessor or 
 
115  The data are collected from the Good Jobs First Violation Tracker, available at 
https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/violation-tracker.    
116 The second category, banking other than consumer-related concerns enforcement of 
the regime of bank regulation including regulations respecting money laundering.  The fourth 
category, “other banking-related consumer-related regulation” includes enforcement activities 
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and enforcement activity concerning credit 
cards, FTC actions and actions under the Servicemen’s Civil Relief Act.   
117  The falloff in securities activity is more apparent than real in any event—the 
“mortgage and securitization” enforcement, although not based on federal securities law, 
concerned activity in the securities markets. 
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successor.    Second, enforcement actions are reactive and commence 
only after a period of investigation.  As long as the economy kept 
humming along until 2007, there was little reason for prosecutors to 
go poking around financial markets.  It is not surprising to see an 
uptick in enforcement after 2008, once deals had gone bad and the 
mobs were out with pitchforks howling against bailouts and in favor 
of accountability at the banks.  And third, as noted, prosecutors and 
regulators were reluctant to squeeze the banks until the financial 
system had stabilized, lest they contribute to the financial crisis 
themselves.   
Table 1.  Top 20 Banks: Fines Incurred, 2000-2018 
Category 
Nominal 
Amount 
Percentage 
Incurred 
2009-2018 
Percentage 
of Total 
Mortgage and 
Securitization $114,732,145,751 99.9 83.7 
Banking (other than 
consumer-related) $7,335,851,414 88.9 5.6 
Securities and 
Commodities Regulation $5,773,754,724 34.4 4.2 
Other Banking-Related 
Consumer Protection 
Regulation 
$2,716,517,000 88.4 2 
Housing and Services 
Discrimination $1,015,113,118 96.5 0.7 
Energy Regulation $460,000,000 89.1 0.3 
Antitrust $380,800,000 100.0 0.3 
Economic sanctions $105,936,859 98.9 0.07 
Employment 
Discrimination $61,086,323 94.3 0.04 
Labor $12,798,031 27.9 0.01 
Environmental Regulation $1,771,892 99.6 0.001 
Total $137,113,959,734 96.7  
Within the “mortgage and securitization” category, 61.8% of 
the fines were incurred in connection with settlements reached under 
two Obama administration enforcement initiatives, both under the 
aegis of a Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (the “Task Force”) 
organized in November 2009 to combat “financial fraud.”   
The first, and larger initiative is the RMBS Working Group, a 
collection of more than 200 attorneys from dozens of federal and state 
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
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the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the 
Federal Reserve) under the leadership of the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), assembled for an “enforcement effort focused on investigating 
fraud and abuse in the RMBS market that helped lead to the 2008 
financial crisis.”118   
The second, smaller, initiative was more focused.  Here the 
DOJ, together with HUD and the attorneys general of 49 states, 
brought claims against the five largest bank servicers (Bank of 
America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Ally Financial 
(formerly GMAC)) “relating to mortgage servicing abuses including 
abuses in the bankruptcy process.”119  In 2012, this initiative resulted 
in a group settlement with a nominal amount of $25 billion,120 making 
up 21% of the $114.7 billion in the mortgage and securitization 
category.   
Other federal enforcement activity accounts for the remaining 
yield of fines in the category—activity yielding a not inconsiderable 
figure of $43.9 billion in our dataset.  These actions emanated mainly 
from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.121  
Here the main push came from “putback” actions instituted by Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHFA.  The packaging of mortgages into 
GSE securitizations entails representations and warranties from the 
seller-packager regarding the mortgages and their underwriting. 122  
When the representations and warranties turn out to have been untrue, 
the GSEs can force the packager to repurchase it.123    
 
118 See, e.g., Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department, Federal 
and State Partners Secure Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading 
Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages, Nov. 19, 2013, available at 
https://bit.ly/2ij1ItZ.  
119  Department of Justice, The National Mortgage Settlement, available at 
https://bit.ly/2D7kKj7.  
120 Id.   
121 Resolution is ongoing.  Bank of America, for example, reports $17.634 billion of 
unresolved repurchase claims related to past securitizations in its 2017 financials.  Bank of 
America Corporation, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2017, supra note 
102, at 144.  
122  See, e.g., Fannie Mae, Selling Guide, § A2-2-01, Dec. 4, 2018, at 
https://bit.ly/2WD7M5pl.  
123 Our figures only represent public settlements of disputed repurchase claims.  The 
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3.  The Bank Targets  
There is a skew in the incidence of enforcement activity, 
particularly in the mortgage and securitization category.  The fines fall 
disproportionately on the Top Six banks.  Figure 2 shows the 
percentage of total fines and damages (95.7%), mortgage-related fines 
and damages (98.3%), and other fines and damages (87.6%) incurred 
by the Top Six, all of which outstrip the group’s 75.6% share of the 
top twenty banks’ total assets.124   
Figure 2. Top Six Banks Share of Fines Incurred and Total 
Assets 
 
We can heighten the contrast by taking some averages. The 
mean of the total assets of the Top Six is 7.2 times greater than the 
mean of the assets of the Second Group; the mean of fines incurred 
by the Top Six in the mortgage and securitization category is 111 times 
the mean of the fines incurred in the category by banks in the Second 
Group.  For all fines and damages (not just mortgage and 
securitization-related) the size multiplier between the average paid by 
the Top Six and the average paid by the Second Group is 52. It should 
be noted that for all fines and damages  outside of the mortgage and 
 
GSEs have also consensually settled billions in repurchase claims.  From 2009 through 2017, 
the GSEs have forced sellers to repurchase over $78 billion in mortgages, but have also 
withdrawn nearly $64 billion in additional repurchase claims.  Inside Mortgage Finance, 2018 
Mortgage Market Statistical Annual:  GSE Repurchase Activity.  
124 The assets taken as of the banks’ most recent calendar year, 2017. 
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securitization category, the Top Six/Second Group size multiplier is a 
much smaller 12.5. But that is still a 74% increase over the asset-based 
size multiplier of 7.2.   
In sum, enforcement activity against banks is up across-the-
board since the crisis, especially against the biggest banks.  By far the 
largest chunk of fines incurred stemmed from the work of the Task 
Force and was laid at the door of the Top Six.  This was in part directly 
tied to subject matter—the enforcers focused on the packaging of 
RMBS and the Top Six (including banks they acquired as the financial 
crisis unfolded, which included Bear Stearns, Countrywide, Merrill 
Lynch, and Washington Mutual) were amongst the largest packagers.125    
But there was more going on—enforcement activity lay 
disproportionately against the Top Six in all subject matter categories.  
This suggests that a target’s public salience matters to the enforcers.  It 
is also possible that there is a cultural tendency towards risk taking and 
noncompliance within universal banks. 
Can we fairly call this scapegoating?  Not if one takes a step 
back and looks the enforcement effort as a form of payback for the 
financial crisis.  For that perspective, the Top Six and the Second 
Group are indeed materially different, for as between the Top Six and 
the Second Group it was the Top Six that caused the financial crisis, 
fully justifying these banks’ selection as targets.   
4. Subject Matter   
The Task Force, then, can be seen to have “gone after” the 
banks that caused the financial crisis, appropriately targeting 
securitization as a proxy for having done so.  But a skew in the 
particulars of the enforcement effort also needs to be noted, for the 
the enforcers focused on only one part of a two-part causal fact 
pattern.   
They singled out the packaging of mortgages into RMBS but 
not the creation, marketing and purchase of the CDOs that made sub-
 
125 See Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 87 at __ (listing the top 20 securitizers).  The 
Top Six plus banks they acquired are ten of the twenty.  Five were excluded from our sample 
as U.S. establishments of foreign banks (Credit Suisse, Deutsche, RBS, UBS) or for 
institutional discontinuity (GMAC); they were not excluded form Task Force enforcement.  
The remaining five include one bank that collapsed, IndyMac, and four nonbank originators.  
Three of them collapsed--Lehman, Ameriquest, and New Century.  The fourth, Option One, 
survived as a mortgage servicer.   
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prime lending possible and then concentrated first-loss risk on the 
mortgages in critical, highly-levered nodes in the system. The 
enforcers, in constructing their bills of particulars and legal theories, 
looked for old-fashioned fraud regarding the quality and origination of 
the mortgages in the RMBS pools.  They bypassed the excessive risk-
taking bound up in the creation of the subprime mortgage market and 
the pecuniary externalities stemming therefrom. 126   The secondary 
initiative against mortgage servicers, which resulted in one-third of 
fines incurred in connection with Task Force settlements, addressed 
an effect rather than the cause of the crisis. The servicing actions 
amounted partly to a consumer protection initiative and partly to a 
phase of a larger campaign to rehabilitate the infrastructure of the 
residential mortgage market.    
 This does not go to say that CDOs entirely slipped through the 
enforcement net.  The first wave of the post-crisis enforcement 
concerned synthetic CDOs.  It began in 2010 with an SECs action 
against Goldman Sachs in respect of its Abacus synthetic, 127 
participations in which had been recklessly marketed and resulted in 
total losses for those holding long positions. The $550 million 
Goldman settlement, a record at the time, was followed by similar SEC 
proceedings against nine other banks in respect of synthetics.  The 
settlements, concluded through 2014, had a $3.76 billion nominal 
amount.128  These are big numbers when considered against pre-crisis 
enforcement initiatives against financial institutions.  But the numbers 
do not impress at all when considered against the Task Force yield.  
There is also a point of commonality.  The SEC, when devising its legal 
 
126 See, e.g., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 113-118, 120-130, 143-46, 188-89 (2011). 
127 Bratton & Levitin, supra note 1, at 848-57.  For discussion of other SEC initiatives 
related to the financial crisis, see Zaring, supra note 111, at 1447-54 (discussing in addition to 
the synthetic CDO actions, enforcement concerning disclosure failures in respect of 
deteriorating conditions at banks and money funds and actions connected to the failure of the 
market in auction rate securities). 
128  See Securities & Exchange Comm’n, SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing 
Misconduct that Led To or Arose from the Financial Crisis (Oct. 7, 2016) available at 
https://bit.ly/2b9w82o; Matthew C. Turk, Securitization Reform after the Crisis: Regulation by 
Rulemaking or Regulation by Settlement? [22] 37 B.U. REV. BANK. & FIN. L. ___ (forthcoming 
2018)(listing Goldman, Wachovia, JP Morgan Chase, Credit Suisse, UBS, RBS, Merrill Lynch, 
and Morgan Stanley). 
 
BRATTON & LEVITIN 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
42 
theories against the packagers of synthetics, went to the same well later 
visited by the Task Force.  Its enforcers targeted misstatements in the 
offering process, but not the reckless magnification of the risk 
attending subprime mortgages facilitated by the transaction form.   
These observations should not be taken to say that the Task 
Force was averse to theoretical innovation, even as it hewed to 
traditional bases of liability.  It had a taste for finding new bottles for 
the old wine.   It avoided federal securities law, even as it packaged 
what amounted to old-fashioned securities law complaints.  It drew 
instead on the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)129  and the False Claims Act,130 a 
post-Civil War qui tam statute, framing allegations out of whole 
doctrinal cloth.  It had its reasons for so doing—FIRREA has a long 
limitations period and a low threshold for proof of claim, and the False 
Claims Act has a treble damages kicker.131  Even so, none of the banks 
forced the Task Force to test its novel statutory applications in court 
and so none of the theories was ever adjudicated.  The entire yield of 
fines and damages was raised at the settlement table.132   
Thus were billions of dollars extracted based on expedient, 
untested legal theories. The targeted banks were on the defensive and 
so could have deemed themselves compelled to settle even where the 
long-term odds might have favored spirited defense.133   In the final 
tally, then, prosecutorial discretion rather than lawmaking determined 
the outcomes, with the economic cost falling entirely on the banks’ 
 
129 Pub. L. No. 101-73, 101 Stat. 183 (1989), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (imposing civil 
liability for acts of fraud committed against banks with federally-insured deposits).   Under the 
novel theory of liability devised by the Task Force, the target bank violates FIRREA by 
defrauding itself.  See Turk, supra note 128, at [26]. 
130 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006).  The statue prohibits making false claims to the 
government, a role played in this case by Fannie Mae.  See Turk, supra note 128, at [26]. 
131 Patricia A. McCoy & Susan Wachter, Representations and Warranties: Why They Did Not 
Stop the Crisis, in Lee Anne Fennell and Benjamin J. Keys, eds., EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION 
IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY [17] (2017).  There was also an unusual reliance on state Blue 
Sky laws. ID.  
132 There was some successful defense as regards the GSE put backs, however.  See U.S. 
ex rel. Edward O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, 822 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2016)(rejecting 
the government’s culpability theory and incorporating the common law’s contemporaneous 
fraudulent intent principle into FIRREA). 
133 Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Ten Years after the Financial Crisis: An Overview, __ B.U. 
REV. BANK. & FIN. L. __, 5 (forthcoming 2018).  
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shareholders.   Rule of law problems attend such exercises of 
“regulation by settlement.”134  
These rule of law deficiencies do not deprive the enforcement 
push of legitimacy, at least not for us.  As we see it, what comes around 
goes around: Just as a financial crisis, by definition, requires regulators 
to put their standard playbooks to one side and extemporize,135 so 
might a financial crisis justify an improvisational ex post reckoning by 
government enforcers, especially in a political economy allergic to 
heavy-handed ex ante regulation. 
5.  Magnitude   
The more worrisome criticism of the enforcement surge 
concerns its magnitude.  The critics take opposing positions.  Some, 
principally in Europe, worry that the enforcers have gone too hard on 
weak banks, which otherwise would be more strongly capitalized.136  
Their opposite numbers scoff at claims of deterrent effectiveness, 
characterizing the penalties as a cost of doing business: so long as the 
present gain from a risky line of investment exceeds the discounted 
expected penalty cost, the banks will continue to run the enforcement 
risk.137  The critics add that effective deterrence presupposes human 
rather than corporate enforcement targets,138 of which none emerged 
in the wake of the financial crisis.139 
So, how much deterrent effect did the enforcement surge leave 
behind?  To see how large the numbers loom, let us take Task Force 
yield against the Top Six, average it, and then compare it to the average 
2017 results of the banks in the group.  The idea is to get a sense of 
the magnitude of the fine set in a settlement concluded a few years ago 
from the point of view of a present-day bank evaluating enforcement 
risk looking forward.   Table 2 sets out the results.  
 
134 Id. at 3.   
135 See Gelpern, supra note 3, at 500-513. 
136 European Systemic Risk Board, Report on Misconduct Risk in the Banking Sector 12-16 
(2015). 
137  Hannes Köster & Matthias Pelster, Financial Penalties and Bank Performance, 79 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 57, 57 (2017). 
138 Schwarcz, supra note 133, at 5; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political 
Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 103-117 (2011). 
139 Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted? 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014 available at https://bit.ly/2BPn38j.  
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Table 2.  Task Force Settlements as Prospective Penalties 
 Top Six Second Group 
Average fines to average 2017 net assets 1.10% 0.07% 
Average fines to average 2017 shareholders’ equity 10.10% 0.60% 
Average fines to average 2017 net earnings 124.50% 6.40% 
If we compare the average Big Six settlement to average Big 
Six total assets, we get a bite of an unimpressive one percent of the 
bank.  If we switch our metric to average shareholders’ equity, the 
figure increases to ten percent, which is still financially unimpressive, 
even as one can imagine it arousing the concern of a safety and 
soundness regulator and triggering some unwelcome financial 
adjustment at the bank.   
Only when we turn the metric to net earnings do we see the 
Task Force finally draw some financial blood—the analysis shows that 
the average settlement wipes out a year and quarter’s worth of 
shareholder return.  But, significantly, the settlements only loom this 
large at the Top Six.  In the Second Group, average Task Force 
settlements amount to only 6.4 percent of 2017 average earnings and 
are miniscule when compared to assets and shareholders’ equity.   
With a little bit of work, we have thus managed to coax out a 
scary-looking statistical snapshot from the enforcement fact pattern.  
But how big is the scare (and the concomitant deterrent constraint) in 
the real world?  Much less than appears, unfortunately, for none of the 
banks actually experienced a net loss year as a result of its Task Force 
settlement process.   JP Morgan Chase, to take an example, did not in 
2013 write a single $18.33 million check that erased its earnings for the 
year.140  Like the other Top Six, JP Morgan entered into its Task Force 
settlements over two years, in this case in 2012 ($5.33 billion) and in 
2013 ($13 billion).  Net of whatever expense charges were taken due 
to the settlements, the bank still reported $21.28 billion in after tax 
earnings in 2012 and $17.92 billion in 2013.   Red ink would have been 
unlikely even if both settlements had come in the same year.  Indeed, 
 
140 Assuming no related run on the bank, it could have written the check in 2013.  It had 
$39.7 billion in its own cash account and $316 billion on deposit at other banks at the end of 
the year and $211.2 billion of shareholders’ equity.   
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JP Morgan, like all companies accounting under GAAP, establishes an 
accounting reserve for contingent liabilities, expensing them on an 
anticipated basis before any payment is made.141  It thereby smooths 
the negative effect of enforcement actions on its earnings across 
multiple periods.   
Let us further unpack JP Morgan’s settlements.  The larger of 
the two was a $13 billion agreement in respect of RMBS.  Only $2 
billion of the $13 billion involved the payment of outright civil 
penalties to the federal government.  The lion’s share, $9 billion, went 
to a variety of governmental entities to settle various fraud-related 
claims, and amounted to compensatory damages.  The last $4 billion 
was a future commitment to come to the aid of consumers with 
mortgage modifications and new originations,142 a figure accordingly in 
need of discounting for time value and uncertainty.   JP Morgan also 
was one of the five mortgage servicers party to the “National Mortgage 
Settlement” of 2012, contributing $5.33 to a total of $25 billion.  In 
that case, all of the sums were either compensatory or involved future 
aid commitments—technically, there were no penalties at all. 
Why do government enforcers prefer to settle for 
compensatory damages and future grants to consumers rather than for 
penalties?  It may be that they have no such preference and that the 
motivation came from the banks’ side of the table.  Under Internal 
Revenue Code section 162(f), a payment to the government “in 
relation to the violation of any law” is not a deductible business 
expense, but the deduction does obtain for payments in restitution or 
remediation. 143   The banks accordingly would have been keenly 
interested in steering the settlements away from penalties and much 
more willing to sign off on a compensatory recovery.  This seems to 
be what happened, and it much blunts the settlements’ deterrent blow.    
 
141 An estimable and probable liability is expensed on the income statement in advance 
of incurrence and booked as a balance sheet liability.   See Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, ASC 450, Contingencies.  JP Morgan Chase’s 2013 financials, 2013 10-K, at 326, report 
an estimated $0 to $5 billion of possible liability above its loss reserve.   
142 Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department, Federal and State 
Partners Secure Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About 
Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages, Nov. 19, 2013, available at https://bit.ly/2ij1ItZ.  
143 26 U.S.C. § 162(f) (2018). 
 
BRATTON & LEVITIN 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
46 
Indeed, the stock market rewarded the settling banks.  Studies 
of the behavior of bank stocks show slightly abnormal negative 
cumulative returns around the date an enforcement initiative is first 
announced, reflecting an expected reduction in cash flows, increased 
business risk, and reputational damage. 144  Around the date of the 
settlement, in contrast, there are slightly positive returns,145 reflecting 
either relief and dissipating uncertainty about an outcome or an 
expectation of governance improvements incident to the bank’s 
experience as an enforcement target.146  One study also confirms that 
settlements have a significant negative effect on earnings going 
forward, but only on pre-tax earnings.  On an after-tax basis, the study 
shows no significant effect on bank profitability,147 a result dependent 
on a compensatory characterization on amounts paid under the 
settlement.    
A caveat should be entered to this discussion, which has been 
very much focused on the Task Force.  The banks greeted GSE and 
FHFA “putback” enforcement under FIRREA and the False Claims 
Act with a more conventional adversarial response.  Bank of America, 
for example, successfully appealed a $1.2 billion verdict.148  They also 
threatened to steer their business plans away from residential lending.  
Wells Fargo’s CEO addressed put back enforcers as follows in an 
interview as follows in August 2014: 
If you guys want to stick with this [program] of ‘putting 
back’ any time, anyway, whatever, that’s fine, we’re just 
not going to make those loans, and there’s going to be 
a whole bunch of Americans that are underserved in 
the mortgage market.149   
In other words, as long as the GSEs were going to insist on enforcing 
representations and warranties, the banks would take their toys and go 
home.    
 
144 See Köster & Pelster, supra note 137, at 59 (surveying the literature). 
145 Sharadha V. Tilley et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Fines on Bank Reputation in 
the US and UK 18-19 (2018) available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2980352.  
146 Köster & Pelster, supra note 137, at 63. 
147 Id. at 62. 
148 Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, Implications of ‘Countrywide’ for Mail and Wire Fraud 
Prosecutions, N.Y.L.J., Jul. 7, 2016, at 1. 
149 Camilla Hall, Wells Chief Warns on Mortgage Lending, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2014. 
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Why the usual stonewalling with the GSEs, but quiet 
cooperation with the Task Force?  We attribute the difference to 
immediate implications for the banks’ business plans.  Where the Task 
Force raked the coals of history, the GSE put backs had threatening 
implications for transactions in the post-crisis pipeline.   
Unsurprisingly, the putback push back got results for the 
banks.  The FHFA, due to concerns about overly aggressive 
representation and warranty enforcement, announced in 2012 that 
representations and warranties regarding loans in future GSE 
securitizations would not be enforced if the loan did not default in the 
first three years.150 
6.  Evaluation   
It seems, then, that there is less deterrent impact than meets 
the eye looking at the $137 billion bottom line.  The message going 
forward should be that a bank, in the wake of significant financial 
externalization involving regulatory arbitrage, can expect to see the 
Feds will show up and extract at least 125 percent of one year’s 
earnings.  But that is not quite the numerical takeaway yielded by 
review of the track record.  The enforcers shied away from challenges 
based on the financial crisis writ large and cabined their claims into 
classic transactional categories like fraud and breach of contract, 
limiting the initiative’s prospective deterrent impact.  The Task Force 
in effect invented two vague torts for the occasion, one related to 
shabby residential mortgage securitization and the other to shabby 
servicing,151 misconduct in any event unlikely to be repeated in the 
post-crisis regulatory environment.  The policy problem going forward 
is risk management at large financial institutions, whether or not 
regulated as banks. 
Let us nonetheless attempt to put a positive gloss on this 
enforcement precedent.  On this view, the terms of the complaints are 
 
150 See “New Lender Selling Representation and Warranties Framework,” MBS News and 
Announcements, Fannie Mae, September 11, 2012; Federal Housing Finance Agency, “FHFA, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Launch New Representation and Warranty Framework,” news 
release, September 11, 2012. 
151 Professors Turk and Schwarcz differ as regards the standard of culpability, Professor 
Turk describing a negligence tort and Professor Schwarcz seeing strict liability on the ground 
the settlements followed from political expediency. Schwarcz, supra note 133, at 5. 
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neither here nor there.  The Task Force was there to extract payback 
for the crisis152 from the big players that caused it.      Given the 
motivation and target profile, the initiative’s more particular legal 
details can be dismissed as unimportant, more a matter of optics than 
of substance.  The enforcers doubtless found that theories more 
closely related to traditional fraud and consumer abuse imparted better 
settlement traction than would have a substantively novel theory 
grounded in the economics of the crisis.  The message going forward 
is that a TBTF bank, in the wake of significant financial externalization 
involving regulatory arbitrage, can expect to see the Feds show up and 
extract a year-and-a-quarter’s earnings based on whatever theory 
resonates in the circumstances.   
One hopes the more positive reading is fair.   If it is, there is a 
follow up argument in the enforcers’ favor: as compared with new 
affirmative regulation, an ex post, punitively motivated enforcement 
blow carries a reduced the risk of unintended future effects.   Critics 
of financial regulation, particularly regulation enacted in the wake of a 
crisis, allege that there’s a tendency to impose crude off-the rack policy 
solutions that turn out to be flawed but nonetheless survive indefinitely 
due to a structural bias favoring the status quo.153  An impromptu ex 
post enforcement strike lacks any such dead weight.  Indeed, we saw 
that in the one case where the enforcement initiative destabilized the 
present lending arrangements—the putback initiative—the FHFA 
promptly imposed a prospective time cap.  
There’s a still a residual question about the numbers.  We have 
seen that even an $18.33 billion settlement tab is insufficient in 
magnitude to trigger red ink in the settlement year. 154  Income 
 
152 This is Professor Turk’s view.  See Turk, supra note 128, at 3 (“[R]egulation by 
settlement in the securitization area can be justified on two grounds. For one, it can be seen 
in second best terms as an imperfect but much-needed backstop against the problem of 
regulatory arbitrage, which is endemic to the financial system and will inevitably be attendant 
to cumbersome statutory regimes such as the Dodd-Frank Act. More surprisingly, regulation 
by settlement can be understood as a first best policy response, because in practice it functions 
to impose a fairly well-tailored Pigouvian tax on the specific externality costs that accompany 
securitization.”). 
153 See Romano, Further Assessment of the Iron law of Financial Regulation, supra note 5, at 1 
(describing a one-way ratchet and recommending a sunset procedure). 
154 JP Morgan incurred the $18.33 over 2012 and 2013.  Net of the whatever hit it took 
in those years, it still showed after tax earnings of $21.28 billion in 2012 and $17.92 billion in 
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smoothing and tort-based enforcement theories lending themselves to 
tax deductibility soften any such blow.  It follows that it would take 
even bigger penalty numbers to send an institutional message with 
culture-altering shock value.  The problem is that the higher the 
number goes, the more likely the enforcement initiative materially 
impairs safety and soundness.  Thus, the system intrinsically caps the 
deterrent magnitude of enforcement initiatives that target the banks as 
corporate entities. 155   This returns us to the standard criticism of 
enforcement initiatives targeting corporations: If deterrence really is 
the enforcement objective, future initiatives must go where the Task 
Force did not, targeting the individuals in charge of bank investment 
policy rather than the banks themselves, both individuals at banks and 
individuals at other financial institutions situated at the system’s risk 
nodes.   
 
III.  MARKET RESPONSES 
This Part takes a new look at the four sectors of the structured 
products market that played leading causative roles in the financial 
crisis—agency-backed home mortgage origination and securitization, 
other private label securitization, synthetic securitization, and 
structured investment vehicles—and looks for traces and replications 
of pre-crisis toxicity.  A mixed report card results.  Although the 
subprime mortgage machine was never reassembled after its collapse, 
many of its individual components are still on the table for utilization.  
Their availability to cater to appetites for risk varies with the venue.  
Post-crisis regulation constrains utilization by banks more tightly than 
utilization by nonbanks.   Meanwhile, nonbank lending and other risk 
taking is on the rise, some cases anticipated by the regulators and 
others not.  Restating, regulatory arbitrageurs are  hard at workin the 
post-crisis framework.  Structured finance, battered and reduced by the 
 
2013.   
155 Cf. Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau: An Overview, 68 BUS. LAW. 557 (2013)(commenting that the CFPB “flips the 
safety and soundness regulatory paradigm on its head” by directing scrutiny to the banks’ most 
profitable product lines). 
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crisis, is recovering, with the rate of recovery following directly from 
the particular product’s track record for reliability. 
A.  The Agency-Backed Home Mortgage Market 
The home mortgage market has experienced a post-crisis 
expansion fueled by low interest rates and the support of securitization 
programs under the sponsorship of the GSEs and Ginnie Mae.   It also 
has experienced structural change.  Nonbank mortgage originators 
have an expanding market share, once again supplying credit to the 
market’s weaker consumers.   The nonbank share is not only greater 
than it was pre-crisis, it now amounts to more than half of the market.  
The banks, still reeling from the shock of the post-crisis enforcement 
initiative, have shifted to indirect participation in the sector, providing 
warehouse lending to the nonbank originators, while reducing direct 
contact with consumers.  New questions about safety and soundness 
arise in the wake of the shift.   
1.  The Emergence of Ginnie Mae and Nonbank Lenders 
The new pattern brings to the fore distinctions among the 
agency-backed securitization platforms—the GSEs (Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac) on the one hand, and Ginnie Mae on the other.  The 
GSEs are conventional securitizers.  They buy and pool mortgages 
from originators, finance the pools with RMBS issued by their own 
SPEs, and set quality standards for the mortgages in the pools.   The 
GSEs take the loss on defaulting mortgages (unless a private mortgage 
insurance company has been inserted into the deal to take the first 
loss).   
Ginnie Mae works differently, operating as a guarantor of 
securities issued by others—the originator pools the mortgages and 
issues RMBS with Ginnie Mae facilitating a backup guaranty.   The 
securitizations eligible for a Ginnie Mae guaranty are securitizations 
comprised of loans insured or guaranteed by the Federal Housing 
Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs, the Farm Service 
Agency, the Rural Housing Service, or the Office of Public and Indian 
Housing.  These agencies provide loan-level insurance or guaranties, 
but they do not promise a particular timeline for payout on their 
insurance or guaranties.  Ginnie Mae fills this gap by guarantying timely 
payment of principal and interest on the RMBS.  The Ginnie Mae 
guaranty is a secondary one, however.  In the event of a default on a 
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mortgage, the servicer must advance the payments due on the 
mortgage to the SPE noteholders for an extended period and 
eventually buy the loan out of the securitization pool.  The servicer can 
then look to the loan-level insurer for whatever coverage might exist.  
Ginnie Mae pays if and only if the servicer is unable to meet its duty 
to advance payments and buy the loan out of the securitization pool.   
The agencies that provide loan-level insurance or guaranties in 
Ginnie Mae deals also set the quality standards for the pooled 
mortgages.  These standards that are looser than those imposed by the 
GSEs.  Delinquency rates bear this out.  In the fourth quarter of 2018, 
serious delinquencies for FHA- and VA-sponsored loans on single 
family homes were 3.7% and 2% respectively; delinquencies on similar 
Fannie and Freddie loans were 0.8% and 0.7%.156   
Ginnie Mae’s market share has been rising steadily since 2008, 
when it was a minor player in the agency-backed market.  Figure 3 
shows that Ginnie Mae’s share of outstanding agency-backed issues 
came to exceed Freddie’s by May 2016.  As of November 2018, market 
shares were as follows: Fannie Mae: 43.2%; Ginnie Mae 29.4%; and 
Freddie Mac 27.4%.157 
 
156 Urban Institute Housing Finance Policy Center, Housing Finance at a Glance: A 
Monthly Chartbook 29 (December 2018). 
157 Urban Institute Housing Finance Policy Center, Housing Finance at a Glance: A 
Monthly Chartbook 7 (January 2018). 
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Figure 3: Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities158 
 
 
The share of nonbank originations in the agency-backed 
market has grown substantially in tandem.  Nonbanks originated 
around 20% of all mortgages in 2007.159  As Figure 4 shows, by mid-
2013 their proportionate share of Fannie, Freddie and Ginnie 
originations ran between 25% and 35%.  There has been a more 
marked rise since then.  By December 2018, 83% of Ginnie issues 
came from nonbank originators compared to 56% at Fannie and 57% 
at Freddie. 
 
158 Id. at 7.  
159 You Suk Kim et al., Liquidity Crises in the Mortgage Market, Brookings Papers on Econ. 
Activity Spring 2018, 347, at 350. 
 
4/26/19] A TALE OF TWO MARKETS 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
53 
Figure 4: Nonbank Origination Share160   
 
 
 Nonbank originations are of lower quality, with the lowest 
quality going through Ginnie Mae.  Although loan-to-value ratios are 
comparable between bank and nonbank originations,161  median debt-
to-income (DTI) ratios differ.  At the GSEs, the banks have been 
loaning at a median of 36% and the nonbanks at 39%.162  Ginnie Mae 
bundles bank originations with a median DTI just under 42%, but 
nonbank originations have a median DTI at just under 44%.163   Data 
on median FICO scores continue the pattern.  At the GSEs, the 
median FICO for bank originations come in at just under 760, while it 
is just under 750 for nonbank originations.164  At Ginnie Mae, the 
bank-originated median FICO is around 700, while the nonbank-
originated median just over 670.165  
It is not as if the banks are withdrawing their capital from the 
housing market, however.   The nonbanks—outfits like Quicken 
Loans, Inc., Freedom Mortgage Company, loanDepot.com, and 
Caliber Home Loans, Inc., to name the top four166—rely on the banks 
for financing.  They fund 95% of their loan originations (or, 
alternatively, loan acquisitions) using secured warehouse lines of credit 
 
160 Urban Institute, supra note157, at 11. 
161 Urban Institute, supra note 156at 14. 
162 Id. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 13. 
165 Id.  
166 See Neil Bhutta et al., Residential Mortgage Lending in 2016: Evidence from the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act Data, 103 FED. RESERVE BULL., number 6, at 24 (Nov. 2017). 
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from banks.167  The  warehouse lines are paid down and the security 
interests in the mortgages in the pool are released upon the closing of 
a GSE or Ginnie Mae securitization pool.168  A recent study estimates 
aggregate bank warehouse commitments at the end of 2016 at $40 
billion.  Because borrowings under the lines of credit turn over 
quickly—the duration from draw down to refunding is 15 days—the 
$40 billion aggregate commitment implies actual annual warehouse 
lending amounting to $1 trillion.169 
2. Systemic Weakness 
Nonbank lenders were the financial crisis’ canary in the 
coalmine.   Then as now, they relied on warehouse lines of credit from 
banks (even as many also funded though captive SIVs).  Of 19 
nonbanks and depositories that relied on warehouse lines before the 
crisis, only two survive today.  The rest either collapsed or were 
acquired by stronger banks in transactions engineered by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. 170   Warehouse lines outstanding 
dropped by 90% between the end of 2006 and mid-2008.171 
Today’s warehouse lines are similarly vulnerable to negative 
shocks.  The loans’ durations tend to be a year or less,172 creating roll-
over risk.  A rise in interest rates can destabilize the borrower’s position 
even in advance of maturity, for these are variable rate facilities.  A rate 
rise also can result in downward marking to market of the value of 
mortgage collateral and a consequent margin call.   Even a slowdown 
in the home lending market in the absence of a rate increase implies 
vulnerability—a mortgage that sits in the pipeline between origination 
and repackaging beyond a minimum period gets pulled out of the 
agency-backed collateral pool.  Finally, borrowers are subject to 
financial covenants, making default a possibility given balance sheet 
deterioration.173   
 
167 Kim et al., supra note 159, at 361. 
168 Id. at 361-62. 
169 Id. at  360. 
170 Id. at 367-68.  The survivors are Nationstar Mortgage and SunTrust. 
171 Id. at 366. 
172 Id. at 369. 
173 Id. at 362-63. 
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Liquidity risk continues even after mortgages have been pooled 
and packaged.  As servicers to the securitized pools, the nonbanks 
commit to back up the payment stream when a mortgage in the pool 
defaults.   With GSE structures, the backup commitment lasts for 120 
days. 174   With Ginnie Mae structures, the commitment to provide 
liquidity to the SPE securityholders covers the life of the loan.  FHA 
loan-level insurance, however, becomes collectable only after 40 
months after a default and then only partially compensates missed 
interest.  The FHA also leaves the servicer with the duty to put the 
collateral into saleable condition.175   The VA’s loan-level guaranty, in 
contrast, covers everything but only up to 25% of the original principal 
amount.176  Both types of loans leave seller-servicers with substantial 
liquidity risk.   
The nonbanks are lightly regulated by the states.   There is an 
effort to tighten scrutiny: safety and soundness examination 
procedures have been developed by the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors and the American Association of Residential Mortgage 
Regulators.177  A proposal for prudential standards also is in process.178  
Meanwhile, more focused scrutiny of the nonbanks comes from the 
GSEs and Ginnie Mae themselves, in the form of minimum capital, 
net worth, and liquidity requirements.179  The required equity capital 
cushion is an undemanding 6%.180 But it is not clear the stepped up 
demands would alleviate problems very much.  Let us hypothetically 
raise the cushion to 10% and see what we have accomplished.  The 
nonbanks rely on short-term borrowed money to support an average 
88% of their total assets.181  Meanwhile the values booked on the left 
sides of their balance sheets depend completely on the health of the 
 
174 Fannie Mae, Servicing Guide: Fannie Mae Single Family § A1-3-07 (2017) available at 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/svc121317.pdf.   
175 Kim et al., supra note 159, at 377-79. 
176 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, VA Servicer Handbook M26-4, ch.14 (2018) 
available at https://www.benefits.va.gov/warms/m26_4.asp.  
177 Kim et al., supra note 159, at 400. 
178 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Proposed Regulatory Prudential Standards for 
Nonbank Mortgage Servicers (2017) available at https://bit.ly/2MQGwMw.  
179 Karan Kaul & Laurie Goodman, Nonbank Servicer Regulation: New Capital and Liquidity 
Requirements Don’t Offer Enough Loss Protection 8-9 (2016) available at https://urbn.is/2t1W0E0 
(criticizing these regulations for risk insensitivity).  
180 Id. at 4. 
181 Kim et al., supra note 159, 395. 
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home mortgage market.  Their asset bases are made up of mortgages 
in the pipeline and intangible mortgage servicing rights.  The latter are 
highly volatile and go straight south when the mortgage market suffers 
a negative shock.182  It follows that there is only so much safety that 
can be added by an upward tick in required equity capital—because 
their assets are soft, these are intrinsically flimsy financial institutions. 
3. Regulatory Roots and Implications 
Three things happened simultaneously around five years ago.  
First, the banks reviewed their business models as post-crisis regulation 
became effective, making consumer lending and securitization more 
expensive out-of-pocket and more heavily freighted with regulatory 
risk.  Second, the banks were either defending, or, more likely, settling 
expensive enforcement actions grounded in consumer lending and 
securitization activity undertaken prior to 2008.   Third, the nonbank 
sector had reconstituted itself and recaptured its pre-crisis share of the 
market.   
Consumer mortgage lending had suddenly become less 
profitable at the banks, markedly so at the primary enforcement 
targets.183  Putback litigation in particular raised the level of regulatory 
risk attending new consumer loans.    Accordingly, the banks made an 
ordinary course adjustment to their business plans.  Faced with a 
sudden shift in the costs and benefits of regulation and enforcement 
respecting agency-backed home lending, they ceded the lower end of 
the consumer market to the nonbanks.184  At the same time, they kept 
their invested capital on the consumer mortgage table in the form of 
warehouse lines of credit to nonbanks.  Given that these lines are 
structured as repos secured by mortgage assets, the banks remain 
exposed to the mortgage market.  If the value of the mortgages posted 
as collateral falls, the banks are likely to take losses.   
The nonbanks remain subject to the same consumer lending 
constraints as the banks, but labor under a marginally less onerous 
regime of safety and soundness.  Their prospective enforcement 
burden also is markedly lighter.  We have seen that post-crisis 
 
182 Kaul & Goodman, supra note 179, at 5-6. 
183 Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, What’s Behind the Non-Bank Mortgage Boom? 17 (2015),  
M-RCBG Associate Working Paper Series No. 42 available at https://bit.ly/2SopMRI.  
184 McCoy & Wachter, supra note 131, at [22].  
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enforcement proceeded after a long pause, while the enforcers waited 
for their targets to emerge from the financial hospital.  The pre-crisis 
nonbank originators never got that far, having ended up in the financial 
mortuary, and so never joined the banks as enforcement targets.  
Nothing in the financial profiles of the post-crisis nonbanks suggests 
any change in this regard.   
B.  Private Label Securitization 
1.  Overview   
Private label securitization issuance (excluding private label 
RMBS) peaked at $796 billion in 2007, with 61% of the volume coming 
from CDO issuance and 10% arising in connection with auto 
lending.185  In 2010 total issuance was $126 billion, 47% of which was 
originated in connection with auto lending, a relatively resilient sector, 
and none of which came from CDOs.186   Table 3 shows that the 
market is once again expanding, having risen in 2018 to $445 billion 
(excluding RMBS) and $686 billion (including RMBS and CLO 
refinancings). 
Table 3. Private Label Securitization, 2015-2018 ($ billions)187 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Asset-Backed 
Securities (including 
auto, credit cards, 
student loan, and 
equipment) 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
 
 
 
191 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
 
 
 
239 
CMBS 101 76 93 77 
CLO 98 72 118 129 
RMBS 54 34 70 86 
Total 436 372 510 531 
CLO reset and 
refinancing 
 
10 
 
39 
 
167 
 
155 
2.  From CDOs to CLOs 
The CDOs that figured into the causal chain of the financial 
crisis were resecuritizations of RMBS—the debt in those collateralized 
 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 S&P Global Ratings, Global Structured Finance Outlook 2019: Securitization Comes to be 
Energized With Potential $1 Trillion in Volume Epxected Again, , Jan. 7, 2019 available at  
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debt obligations tended to be mezzanine and junior tranches of private 
label securitizations of residential mortgages.188   Nothing in post-crisis 
regulation prevents the assembly or sale of such packages.  But our 
search for renewed activity yields a null set.  The only CDOs still in 
existence are pre-crisis holdovers. 
But there remains an appetite for private label collateralized 
debt. It is just that the debt collateralized is not resecuritized RMBS 
but loans to corporations, often but not necessarily made by banks.  
These collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) are the anomaly in this 
discussion.  They shine forth as the only segment of the private 
structured credit market enjoying a present rate of growth higher than 
the level before the crisis.  Indeed, in recent years, the CLO market has 
been growing faster than the corporate bond market.189  From a post-
crisis trough of $263 billion, the amount outstanding now exceeds 
$450 billion.190    
The anomaly is two-sided, for not only has the CLO market 
grown, it has done so in the teeth of substantial regulatory barriers 
imposed under Dodd-Frank.  A two-sided lesson follows in turn.  First, 
keen demand for structured products still exists, provided the product 
possesses risk-return characteristics attractive to portfolio managers 
with long-term time horizons.191  Second, given such investor demand, 
regulatory barriers stemming from a desire to deter risk-taking at banks 
do not prevent growth in the market even as they (by definition) inhibit 
it.  There is also a concomitant warning: between light regulation of 
corporate lending by banks and the nonexistence of regulation of 
corporate lending by nonbanks, the CLO may be facilitating excess 
risk-taking in its sector with negative implications for the wider 
 
https://www.capitaliq.com/CIQDotNet/CreditResearch/RenderArticle.aspx?articleId=214
9773&SctArtId=465279&from=CM&nsl_code=LIME&sourceObjectId=10827894&source
RevId=7&fee_ind=N&exp_date=20290110-16:07:04. 
188 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 126, at 113-18. 
189 Guggenheim Investments, Understanding Collateralized Loan Obligations 5 (April 2017).  
Only the growth of bank loans themselves is higher.  Id. 
190 Id. at 2; Laila Kollmorgen, CLOs: Why Now, available at https://bit.ly/2TrKOw3.  
191 Cf. Guggenheim Investments, supra note 189, at 4-6 (comparing contemporary asset 
managers to short-term traders in securitized products pre-crisis).   $118 billion new CLOs 
were issued in 2017 making 2017 the next best year ever for the sector, the best having been 
2014 with $124 billion.  See It’s Official: US Leveraged Loans Are a $1 Trillion Market, available at 
http://www.leveragedloan.com/category/clo.  
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economy.  Some today think that CLOs are to the economy’s next 
recession what CDOs were to the financial crisis.  
i. Characteristics 
 The CLO comeback can be accounted for easily: CLO defaults 
during the crisis were minimal—less than one percent.192  Not that 
there wasn’t a rough patch—new CLO issuance almost ceased 
beginning in the third quarter of 2007193 and market values of CLO 
tranches declined as investors dumped any and all securitized paper in 
2008.  But values recovered by 2011 as the economy stabilized and the 
market caught on to the fact that corporate loans, even junk bond 
equivalent loans encased in CLOs (called “leveraged loans”), had 
weathered the crisis much better had loans on residential real estate.  
New CLO issues followed, with activity moving in lockstep with 
growth in leveraged corporate bank lending.194  
There are two transaction types—balance-sheet CLOs and 
arbitrage CLOs. Balance-sheet CLOs are the functional equivalents of 
bank-originated RMBS: a bank transfers a corporate loan portfolio to 
an SPE which finances the transfer by selling tranched debt 
securities.195  Arbitrage CLOs, in contrast, are not initiated by loan 
originators.  Here, an asset manager goes into the OTC trading market 
for bank loans and engineers the SPE’s purchase of interests in existing 
loans.  The SPE funds the purchase with lower yielding liabilities, 
thereby picking up a spread for the benefit of the junior investors in 
the CLO. 196   Most of the market’s action occurs in the arbitrage 
category. 
 
192 Efaim Benmelech, et al., Securitization without Adverse Selection: The Case of CLOs, 106 J. 
FIN. ECON. 91, 93 (2012). 
193 Id. at 92-93. 
194 Guggenheim Investments, supra note 189, at 2-3. 
195 These were the first CLOs.  The transaction form dates to the mid-1990s.  The 
motivation, as with balance-sheet synthetic securitization, see infra text accompanying note __: 
bank capital relief.  The bank, provided it retained the servicing rights, could securitize a 
relational loan portfolio without overly disrupting client relations.  Getting capital relief, 
however, meant avoiding any retention of subordinated trances.  See Kenneth Kohler, 
Collateralized Loan Obligations: A Powerful New Portfolio Management Tool for Banks, available at  
https://bit.ly/2Tqs6VC.  
196 Deloitte, CLO Structures: An Evolution 2 (2017).  
 
BRATTON & LEVITIN 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
60 
As noted, the loans bundled into arbitrage CLOs tend to be 
leveraged loans.  Leveraged loans are loans made by banks, or, in the 
alternative, underwritten and packaged by banks, to borrowers with 
noninvestment grade credit ratings—the bank lending equivalent of 
junk bonds.  Many of these loans originate as “tranche B” add-ons to 
“tranche A” term loans made by syndicates of banks.  Compared to 
the A tranches, tranche B loans tend to have longer durations and 
junior security—the tranche A takes a first lien on the borrower’s 
property while the tranche B is relegated to a second lien.197   Where 
tranche A loans tend to be privately placed amongst groups of bank 
participants, tranche B loans are underwritten into a limited-access 
trading market populated by nonbank lenders like asset managers, 
hedge funds, private equity funds, pension funds, and Business 
Development Companies (BDCs).198   An arbitrage CLO comes into 
existence when a “manager” (either an asset management firm or a 
private equity firm) teams up with an “arranger” (a large bank).  The 
manager organizes the CLO SPE and has it draw down on a warehouse 
loan from a bank to go into the trading market and assemble a 
portfolio of leveraged loans.  The arranger lines up purchasers for the 
CLO’s tranches, collecting commitments to purchase and negotiating 
prices.  The arranger then underwrites the CLO.  Some of the proceeds 
go to pay down the warehouse loan; the excess is used to buy more 
 
197 BRATTON, supra note 97 at 341. .  Proponents of CLOs are quick to point out that 
default rates on CLO tranches between 1994 and 2013 were substantially lower than default 
rates on corporate bonds.  Guggenheim Investments, supra note 189, at 3.  Indeed, there has 
never been a default on a AAA or AA- tranche and even junior tranches have done better than 
have bonds. Id. at 2-3.   This is true, but the closer one looks, the less surprising it is.  Leveraged 
loans, whether tranche A or B are secured; corporate bonds, whether investment or 
noninvestment grade, are not.   
198 A BDC is a registered closed-end investment company organized to provide financing 
to small and medium sized companies.  See Guggenheim, Income Opportunity in the Middle 
Market: An Overview of Business Development Companies (BDCs) 1-2 available at 
https://www.guggenheiminvestments.com/.../BDCS010/An-Overview-of-Business-Dev....  
In recent years a third variety of of leveraged loan has been developed in the nonbank sector—
a “unitranche” facility that moves all matters relative to seniority and subordination into an 
“Agreement Among Lenders” negotiated on the side.  See Laura Appleby, et al., Leveraged 
Lending Guidelines, New Debt Structures and Pitfalls in Bankruptcy, 30 AIRA J, No.. 2 at 
1011-12 (2016). 
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loans.  On an “effective date” the CLO’s loan portfolio has been 
completed.199 
The structure that starts operation on the effective date is one-
part securitization, one-part corporate bond, and one-part structured 
investment vehicle.  Assets in the SPE are actively managed during a 
“reinvestment period.”  The manager has the power to add new loans 
to the portfolio, reinvesting principal payments received on existing 
loans and the proceeds of any loans sold back into the trading market.   
At the expiration of this period the vehicle goes into amortization and 
principal received and the proceeds of any loan sales go to pay off the 
principal of the tranches in order of seniority.  There is also a non-call 
period.  When this expires, the “equity” investors holding the junior 
tranches can by majority vote decide to pay down any or all senior 
tranches at par, financing the pay down either by having the SPE sell 
portfolio loans or issue new senior tranches (presumably at a lower 
interest rate).200  A refinancing of all senior tranches can be combined 
with a time extension, based on a unanimous vote of the equity.  This 
is called a “reset.”  The equity has every reason to consent to a reset 
given good market conditions, an effective manager, a desire to remain 
invested in the sector, and an attractive loan portfolio already in 
place.201 
Add all of this up, and the manager and the holders of the 
equity tranches together exercise discretion respecting the entity’s 
choice of assets and duration, potentially impairing the interests of 
holders of senior tranches.  Coverage tests constrain this discretion.  
CLOs are set up to be overcollateralized and negative consequences 
follow when the collateral loses value.  A percentage test must be met 
for each senior tranche—for example, the indenture could require the 
principal value of the assets in the SPE to exceed 125% of the face 
amount of the tranche.   If the assets in the SPE fail to pass the test, 
reinvestment by the manager stops and all cash received goes to pay 
down the tranches in order of seniority until such time as the test is 
met.202  An interest coverage test operates similarly.  There is also a test 
 
199 Loan Securitization and Trading Ass’n, Overview of CLOs 6 (June 2017). 
200 Id. at 6, 22. 
201 Id. at 22. 
202 Guggenheim Investments, supra note 189, at 3; Deloitte, supra note 196, at 4. 
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that caps the assets’ weighted average life to maturity, preventing the 
manager from shifting to higher risk assets for the equity’s benefit.203 
ii. Evolution and Regulation 
CLOs have evolved in three phases, called CLO 1.0, 2.0, and 
3.0.  CLO 1.0 covers the first generation through the financial crisis.  
CLO 2.0 is the first generation of post-crisis issues.  CLO 3.0 
succeeded CLO 2.0 around 2014, adjusting for new regulatory 
constraints. 
The transition from CLO 1.0 to CLO 2.0 concerned risk and 
return.  Terms were adjusted to make senior tranches safer and more 
attractive: non-call and reinvestment periods became shorter, 204 
leverage ratios declined, 205  and collateral eligibility requirements 
tightened.206   There were also adjustments to boilerplate indenture 
provisions that had given rise to disputes and litigation.   Some of these 
imported flexibility to the manager—it was made clear that managers 
could consent to modifications of the loans in the portfolio in the 
event of borrower distress.207  Other changes closed loopholes that had 
opened doors to opportunistic conduct by equity tranche holders.208 
The transition from CLO 2.0 to CLO 3.0 concerned 
compliance hurdles erected by the Dodd-Frank Act.  One came from 
the Act’s Volcker Rule.  Banks can run afoul of it when they invest in 
arbitrage CLOs, whether by providing warehouse financing, holding 
equity, or even holding  senior tranches. 209   The solution to the 
problem lies in setting up an arbitrage CLO so that it qualifies for a 
Volcker Rule exception for bank securitizations. 210   The CLO is 
 
203 Id.  
204 Reinvestment went from 5 to 7 years to 3 to 4; non-call went from 3 to 4 to 1.5 to 2.  
Id. at 5. 
205 Id. at 5. 
206 Id. at 4.   
207 Craig Stein, U.S. CLOs: Past and Present, J. STRUCTURED FIN. (Summer 2016) at 16, 17-
18. 
208 Id. at 16-17.  See Concord Real Estate CDO 2006-1, Ltd. v. Bank of America, 996 
A.2d 324 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d 15 A.3d 216 (Del. 2011)(interpreting CLO language governing 
overcollateralization). 
209 Under the definition of “ownership interest,” a right to vote to remove and replace 
the investment manager causes an interest to fall within the category.  Senior tranche sin most 
CLOs tranches get that right. [cite] 
210 Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
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“Volckerized” by including an affirmative provision that limits the 
vehicle from investing in anything other than bank loans. 211  The 
provision limits the CLO’s upside, but is easily enough interpolated 
into a new deal.  Existing deals presented a problem, however.  
Historically, managers of arbitrage CLOs have retained (and utilized) 
explicit powers to stoke the yield on the portfolio with bonds, floating 
rate notes, and letters of credit.212  For existing CLOs, Volckerization 
means amending away this power, incidentally benefiting the holders 
of senior tranches.   Because the amendment has the effect of lowering 
returns to holders of the junior tranches, give-backs had to be tacked 
on in exchange for junior votes.213  
Dodd-Frank’s risk retention rules, which became effective in 
December 2016, 214  created a second problem.  Indeed, many in the 
sector thought that risk retention amounted to a death knell for 
arbitrage CLOs.  Recall that the risk retention rules are designed to 
ameliorate moral hazard in originators by forcing them to retain 5% of 
each securitization, whether in a horizontal or vertical slice.  With 
arbitrage CLOs there is no originator—the manager has made no 
loans. It instead acts like other asset managers and causes an entity to 
buy assets in a trading market, in this case loans rather than securities.  
Like other asset managers, the CLO manager will be thinly capitalized.  
It follows that being required to invest $50 million long-term in order 
 
Protection Act at 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (codified at  
12 U.S.C. §1841), prohibits a bank from taking an ownership interest in a “hedge fund or 
private equity fund.”  The covered funds are intended to be private equity firms and hedge 
funds but are generally defined as investment companies relying on the registration 
exemptions in Investment Company Act sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7), pursuant to Bank 
Holding Company Act section 13(h)(2), 12 U.S.C. 1851(h)(2).  CLOs also tend to rely on 
section 3(c)(7), which limits access to “qualified purchasers.”    
211 Along with exempted servicing assets and derivatives related to the loans in the 
portfolio. See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, 
and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg, 5536, 5788 
(2014).  
212 Stein, supra note 207, at 21. 
213 Id.  Balance-sheet CLO practice is also affected.  Banks customarily threw all sorts of 
things into CLO SPEs. See Kohler, supra note 195 (mentioning participation interests, 
structured notes, revolving credit facilities, trust certificates, letters of credit, bankers’ 
acceptances, synthetic lease facilities, guarantee facilities, corporate bonds and asset-backed 
securities). 
214 Dodd Frank Act, section 941, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(a)(3). 
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to assemble a $1 billion loan portfolio would be prohibitively 
burdensome for some in the sector. 215 
But the hurdle was surmounted by the time the risk retention 
rules became effective.216  The managers created special vehicles in 
which they placed the retained tranches and recruited a new set of 
equity investors, pension funds most prominently, to invest in the 
vehicles, becoming the CLO manager’s partner in holding the junior 
interest.217  For the managers, 2017 turned out to be a banner year, 
despite risk retention.218 
The industry, even as it solved the retention problem in 
practice, also successfully brought a court challenge to the 
government’s 219  application of the risk retention rules to arbitrage 
CLOs.220  The issue was whether the a manager is a “securitizer” within 
the meaning of Dodd Frank section 941(a)(3) as someone who 
“organizes and initiates an asset backed securities transaction by selling 
or transferring assets.”221  The D.C. Circuit,  in Loan Syndications & 
Trading Association v. SEC, read the language literally, holding that even 
as asset managers do “organize and initiate” arbitrage CLOs, they 
neither “sell” nor “transfer” assets to the SPE. 222   And, literally 
speaking, the industry did have the better side of the argument.  The 
CLO SPEs buy the loans from the market directly; nothing is sold or 
transferred by the manager.   We nonetheless do not doubt that the 
statute’s drafters, if questioned on the matter, would answer that they 
intended CLO managers to be covered by section 941.  Unfortunately, 
they did not manage to draft their way into that result in a literal-
minded world.  
 
215 Deloitte, supra note 196, at 8. 
216 See 79 Fed. Reg. 77,601 (Dec. 24, 2014). 
217 Global Capital, Securitization: Hot Loan Market to Test CLO Managers’ Mettle in 
2018, available at https://bit.ly/2WFrkX5.  
218 See supra text accompanying note 190.   
219 Collectively, the SEC, the FRB, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency.  These agencies explicitly included the managers as 
securitzers in the final rules under Dodd Frank section 941. See 79 Fed. Reg. 77,654 (Preamble). 
220 Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 882 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
221 15 U.S.C. § § 78o-11(a)(3).  
222 882 F.3d at 222-23. 
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iii. Excessive Risk 
 CLOs contain portfolios of leveraged loans, and, indeed are 
the leveraged loan market’s biggest purchasers, having soaked up 
around one-half of the amount outstanding.223  It follows that the CLO 
structure becomes implicated when regulators express concerns about 
the deteriorating creditworthiness of leveraged corporate borrowers 
and excess risk-taking by leveraged lenders.  Such expressions were 
numerous and loud in late 2018,224 when the face amount of leveraged 
loans outstanding came to exceed $1 trillion, making the leveraged loan 
debt stock half as big as the stock of high yield bonds.225  To see the 
cause for concern, compare Figure 5 with Figure 6.  Figure 5 depicts 
the ratio of US household indebtedness to GDP since 2006, showing 
a peak at the beginning of the Great Recession followed by a steady 
and continuing decline.  Figure 6 depicts total credit to US nonfinancial 
Figure 5.  US Household Debt to GDP, 2006-2018226 
 
223  See Briefing, American Corporate Debt, ECONOMIST 19, 21 (Mar. 16, 2019); Alphaville: Who’s 
Buying Leveraged Loans Anyway? FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2018 available at 
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2018/11/20/1542706123000/Who-s-buying-leveraged-loans-
anyways-/. 
224 See, e.g., Briefing, American Corporate Debt, Economist 19, 21 Mar. 16, 2019; Mayra 
Rodriguez Valladares, Leveraged Loan Market Warnings Have Been Ignored For Over Five Years, 
FORBES (Oct.26, 2018) available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2018/10/26/leveragedloanmarket
warningshavebeenignoredforoveriveyears/#1b857d023df3;  Jesse Hamilton, Fed's Warning 
on Leveraged Loans Seconded by U.S. Bank Regulator  (Dec. 3, 2018) available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-03/fed-s-warning-on-leveraged-loans-
seconded-by-u-s-bank-regulator; Kristen Haunss, Regulators Sound the Alarm about 
Leveraged Loan Market (Oct. 30, 2018), available at 
https://www.reuters.com/article/regulators-sound-the-alarm-about-leverag/regulators-
sound-the-alarm-about-leveraged-loan-market-idUSL8N1XA7MH. 
225 Anaïs Brunner, et al., Leveraged loans or High Yield Bonds? Finding the Best Income 
Solution in a Rising Rate Environment (July 2018) available at 
https://www.ubs.com/content/dam/static/.../leveraged-loans-or-high-yield-bonds.pdf. 
226 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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Figure 6.  Total Credit to US Nonfinancial Corporations to GDP, 
1950-2019227 
 
corporations to GDP since 1950.  A post-crisis reduction in this macro 
debt equity ratio has been reversed—corporate leverage is now at an 
all-time high.   
Speaking roughly, the regulators are worried that today’s CLOs 
are to corporate debt what the previous decades’ CDOs were to 
residential real estate debt—the means to the end of a massive 
overleveraging with potentially destabilizing effects for the rest of the 
economy.   Underwriting standards at origination have declined, they 
say, even as leverage rises inexorably.228 
 There is only so much the safety and soundness regulators can 
do about this, for much of the market is populated by nonbank lenders 
and nonbank purchasers and so lies outside of their immediate reach.  
And, as with nonbank lending in the residential mortgage sector, 
regulatory initiatives against the banks are thought to have played a 
 
227 Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
228 Briefing, American Corporate Debt supra note 224, at 20. 
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causative role in the nonbank surge.229  In this case the initiative is a set 
of lending guidelines promulgated in 2013 by the Federal Reserve and 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). 230   The 
guidelines include underwriting standards and risk management 
instructions regarding leveraged loans in the banks’ portfolios and in 
the pipeline for securitization.  As explicated by the agencies, the 
guidelines cover not only loans originated and retained by a banks but 
loans in CLOs sponsored by the bank and CLOs funded by the 
bank.231   
The causal account resonates, but there is also reason for 
caution.  The Government Accountability Office ruled that in 2017 
that the Guidelines amount to a rule under the Congressional 
Accountability Act232 and so are subject to Congressional review and 
rejection.  Each of the OCC and the Fed have since signaled that the 
Guidelines would no longer be enforced.233  Any side-effect respecting 
nonbank lending thus lies in the past. Meanwhile the regulators’ recent 
expressions of concern about corporate leverage are doubly 
understandable.   
3.  From Subprime to Nonprime RMBS 
Subprime mortgage origination with a view to securitization 
returned in 2014,234 rebranded as “nonprime.”  Such titular cleansings 
 
229 See, e.g., Ropes & Gray, OCC Head Says Banks Need Not Comply with Leveraged 
Lending Guidance (Mar. 1, 20180 available at 
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2018/03/OCC-Head-Says-Banks-Need-
Not-Comply-with-Leveraged-Lending-Guidance.  
230 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending, 78 Fed. Reg. 17766-01 (Mar. 22, 2013). 
231 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation & Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) for 
Implementing March 2013 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending (Nov. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20141107a3.pdf. 
232 GAO Letter to Sen. Pat Toomey, 163 Cong. Rec. S6636 (Oct. 19, 2017). 
233 "Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy," hearing before the US House 
Financial Services Committee, remarks of FRB Chairman Jerome Powell (Feb. 27, 2018); 
"OCC Head Says Banks Not Bound by Lending Guidelines, Expects Leverage to Increase," 
Debtwire (Feb. 27, 2018), available at https://www.debtwire.com/info/occ-head-says-banks-
not-bound-lending-guidelines-expects-leverage-increase. 
234 Fitch Ratings, The Return of Non-Prime U.S. RMBS: What Investors Need to Know 3, Jan. 
25, 2017, available at www.fitchratings.com.  
 
BRATTON & LEVITIN 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
68 
are not uncommon in finance—those from “junk bond” to “high-yield 
bond” and from “leveraged buyout” to “private equity” being the most 
prominent.     Significantly, in the case of subprime the change is not 
just cosmetic.  “Subprime” described mortgages that qualified as 
neither prime nor Alt-A in the regulatory environment that prevailed 
prior to the financial crisis.  “Nonprime” describes nonqualifying loans 
in a regulatory environment much altered by Dodd-Frank.    
Literally speaking, “nonprime” means not a Qualifying 
Mortgage (QM) within the meaning of the ability-to-repay and risk 
retention rules.  Non-qualification has two consequences.  First, the 
mortgage has no safe harbor and the originator must satisfy the full-
dress ability-to-repay rules.  Second, under a parallel qualification 
standard in the risk retention rules, the originator must retain 5%.235  
Between the two requirements, origination to securitize costs the 
originator considerably more per dollar loaned in the nonprime sector 
than in the qualified sector.236  There is also a negative kicker, for the 
added regulatory risk held out under the ability-to-repay rules extends 
beyond the originator to the securitization trust—a borrower’s defense 
to foreclosure respecting an ability-to-repay violation sweeps in not 
only the lender but its assignees.237  There being no safe-harbor, the 
SPE would have to prove that the originator complied with the ability-
to-repay  underwriting standards.238 
If the new nonprime market has a mantra, it is “proper 
underwriting.”239  Even so, quality control questions loom large in 
nonprime negotiations.   No across-the-board answers have emerged: 
the sell-side and the buy-side have not yet hammered out a standard 
set of generally accepted contract terms.  Unsurprisingly, seller 
representations and warranties are the sticking point.  The buy-side 
 
235 See Ron D’Vari & Timothy Bernstein, What Lies Ahead: The Challenges of Securitizing 
Non-Qualifying Mortgage Loans, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2016 4749-51. 
236 The D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Loan Syndications & Trading Association v. SEC, see text 
accompanying note 220 supra, may hold out some regulatory relief.  Aggregators operate 
alongside originators as sponsors of nonprime securitizations.  To the extent that the 
aggregation practice fits into the exception from the risk retention rules opened up in the case, 
a door could be opened to  volume expansion in the sector. 
237 12 U.S.C. § 1640(k) (overriding limitation on assignee liability of 12 U.S.C. § 1641).   
238 Fitch Ratings, supra note 234, at 13-14. 
239Subprime Mortgages Make a Comeback—with a New Name and Soaring Demand, 
Apr. 12, 2018, available at https://cnb.cx/2GWQV9m.  
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wants more in the way of backup regarding nonperforming loans than 
the sellers are willing to provide.240  Intermediaries patch over the 
points of disagreement by adding credit enhancements.   
Other new buyer protections have settled in as practice 
standards.  Third party oversight is the norm—nonprime deals are 
conditioned on independent third-party review of each loan in the 
pool.241  Payment waterfalls are now more favorable to senior tranches, 
drawing on CLO structures that cut off principal payments to junior 
tranches.242 
Finally, and most importantly, nonprime loans are not nearly 
as “sub” as were subprime loans.  During the period 1998 to 2008, the 
average FICO score of prime mortgage borrowers was 736, the 
average Alt-A score was 711, and the average subprime score was 623.  
Nonprime deals have average FICOs of 697, much closer to pre-crisis 
Alt-A than to subprime.243  Even so, where many nonprime borrowers 
obtain loans insured by the FHA, the loans in nonprime RMBS would 
generally fail to qualify under for insurance FHA’s guidelines.244  
The lending on nonprime loans is done almost entirely by 
nonbanks.  The archetypical nonprime originator or aggregator is a 
subsidiary of a private equity firm with pre-existing expertise in 
residential real estate lending and investment.245  As with nonbank 
lending more generally, the banks participate on a secondary basis only, 
both as warehouse lenders to originators and aggregators and as 
underwriters.246    Their reticence makes sense in view of the difficulties 
 
240 Fitch Ratings, supra note 234, at 4.  The buyers want independent third-party review 
of any loan that becomes delinquent along with binding arbitration; the sellers resist.   See also 
D’Vari & Bernstein, supra note 235, at 51-52. 
241 Fitch Ratings, supra note 234, at 3.  See also D’Vari & Bernstein, supra note 235, at 52-
53. 
242 Fitch Ratings, supra note 234, at 4. 
243 Id. at 2.     
244 Loans tend to fall into the nonprime category because the principal amount exceeds 
the FHA limit, a prior credit event makes the borrower ineligible, or there is some shortcoming 
in the documentation.  Id.   
245 Id. at 9-11. 
246  See Subprime Mortgages Make a Comeback—with a New Name and Soaring 
Demand, Apr. 12, 2018 available at https://cnb.cx/2GWQV9m; Big Banks Expose 
Themselves to Subprime Loans through Other Lenders, Apr. 10, 2018 available at 
https://bit.ly/2D13dJb.  
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stemming from the combination of the risk retention rules and 
stepped-up capital requirements.247  Indeed, with many of the banks 
still dealing with (or recovering from) litigation stemming from 
subprime originations prior to 2008, it would take a powerful financial 
incentive get them to return to origination in this sector.   It does not 
appear that nonprime spreads have been wide enough hold out the 
necessary inducement.  
Nonprime RMBS deal volume has grown since 2014, when a 
mere $500 million were issued.248  By 2017, the figure had grown to 
$4.1 billion;249 The 2018 figures come in at over $12 billion.250  But 
nonprime is still just a niche in the overall private label market.  The 
$12 billion 0f 2018 issues comprised only 14 percent of private RMBS 
issuance and 1.7 percent of overall private issuance.  
4.  Comparison 
There are noteworthy parallels between the post-crisis CLO 
and nonprime markets.  In both cases, nonbank intermediaries 
jumpstarted a moribund transaction form, innovating in the process, 
partly to achieve compliance with new regulations and partly to 
reallocate risk from seniors to juniors to adjust for changes in investor 
risk preferences.   With CLOs, the innovators met with significant 
success where with nonprime results have been modest.  Track records 
certainly have something to do with this—CLOs have an excellent 
record where subprime does not.  Regulation certainly also matters—
the ability-to-repay compliance cost burdens attending nonprime 
origination have no parallel in the corporate market.  But yields also 
matter—nonprime yields apparently are not high enough to trigger 
strong investor demand.  Finally, as we will see in the next section, 
there is also a new, synthetic mode of high risk-high return 
participation in home mortgage credit that soaks up potential demand 
for high risk/high return products.  
 
247 D’Vari & Bernstein, supra note 235, at 53. 
248 Fitch Ratings, supra note 234, at 3. 
249 Jeff Andrews, Subprime Mortgage Bonds are Making a Comeback, Mar. 30, 2018 available at 
https://bit.ly/2Gn5LBR.  It is noted that the effective date of risk retention for RMBS was 
December 24, 2015 did not coincide with a decrease in deal flow. 
250 Ben Eisen, No Pay Stub? No Problem.  Unconventional Mortgages Make a Comeback, WALL 
ST. J. Jan. 23, 2019, https://on.wsj.com/2CD0R3a.  
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C.  Synthetic Securitization and Credit Default Swaps 
This section takes up synthetic securitization, which when 
referenced to collateralized debt obligations yielded the most toxic of 
all pre-crisis structured products.  These were the vehicles that made 
the famous “short” on the mortgage market in The Big Short,251 that 
triggered Goldman Sachs’s Abacus scandal, and that brought down 
AIG.252   They greatly magnified the risk-taking attached to subprime 
mortgages 253  without facilitating so much as one dollar of real 
investment.  Indeed, to the extent that synthetics competed with real 
securitizations, they diverted investment from the home mortgage 
market.  Yet nothing in post-crisis regulation prohibits them.  They 
continue to be produced in considerable volume; interestingly, the 
GSEs are the major users.   
Synthetic CDOs conjoin a securitization and a credit default 
swap (CDS).  We accordingly take the occasion for a brief review of 
the post-crisis regime of swap regulation. 
1.  Balance Sheet Synthetics 
Synthetic securitization originated to as device to facilitate 
regulatory capital relief for banks by expanding the availability of CDS 
protection.  Banks routinely enter into CDS with other banks as a 
means of diversifying the risk attending their portfolios of corporate 
loans.   When such a swap is entered into with a sufficiently sound 
bank counterparty, the bank capital rules’ risk weighting of the 
referenced loan is reduced from 100% (implying equity capital support 
of 8 cents on the dollar) to 20% (reducing the support requirement to 
1.6 cents on the dollar).  Synthetic securitization expands the 
population of qualified swap counterparties.     
In a synthetic securitization, the bank sets up an SPE which 
funds itself by selling “credit linked notes” (CLNs).  The SPE invests 
the proceeds of the sale of the notes in treasury securities and enters 
into a credit default swap with the bank referencing the bank’s loan 
portfolio.  This swap covers approximately twenty percent of the face 
value of the loan portfolio and takes the first loss risk.  The combined 
returns on the swap and the treasuries put the SPE in a position to 
 
251 MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010). 
252 Bratton & Levitin, supra note 1, at 847-63. 
253 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 126, at 143-46, 188-89. 
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offer an attractive yield on the CLNs, which serve as the 
securitization’s mezzanine and junior tranches.  The remaining 80 
percent of the default risk on the bank’s portfolio, called “super 
senior,” is transferred under a CDS entered into directly between the 
bank and another financial institution. 254   From the point of view of 
the bank buying CDS protection on its loan portfolio, the deal makes 
sense if the value of the capital relief exceeds the cost of the swaps.   
Prior to the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board 
accorded risk weighting relief from 100% to 20% for corporate loan 
portfolios protected under these arrangements on the condition that 
the counterparty to the super senior swap had a AAA credit rating.255  
When the capital relief question came up again after the financial crisis 
the Fed modified its view.   It now grants capital relief only if the SPE 
is unaffiliated with the bank.   It views affiliated SPEs as suspect, in 
effect analogizing them to bank SIVs:  
[S]uch transactions . . . generally do not involve 
effective risk transfer because of the sponsored entity’s 
ongoing relationship with the firm and . . . the implicit 
obligation that the firm may have to provide capital to 
the sponsored entity in a period of financial stress 
affecting the sponsored entity.256 
The Fed’s ruling has had a chilling effect on use of balance 
sheet synthetics by banks in the United States.257   European bank 
regulators do not disqualify affiliated structures and the transactions 
have reappeared there during the last five years.258 
Substantial transaction volume does continue in the US, but 
not at the banks.  Today’s major users are the GSEs, which are using 
 
254 Bratton & Levitin, supra note 1, at 817-19.  The super senior CDS can be omitted, 
with the result that the bank has to show capital above the risk-weighted minimum to support 
the residual default risk on the portfolio.  See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, S-R 13-23 (Dec. 20, 2013).    
255 GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. 
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 60-
62, 78-79 (2009).  
256 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, S-R 13-23 (Dec. 20, 2013).    
257  US Banks Exploring Synthetic CLO Revival, ABALERT (Oct. 7, 2016) available at 
https://www.abalert.com/search.pl?ARTICLE=169589.  
258 Daniel N. Budofsky, A Resurgence of Synthetic Securitizations (June 20, 2017) available at 
https://bit.ly/2MN2Lmf; Synthetic Securitisation: A Different Sort of Comeback (June 2017) 
available at https://bit.ly/2G805zj.  
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balance sheet synthetics to transfer default risk on the mortgages in the 
RMBS pools they guarantee. 
GSE securitization separates interest rate risk and credit risk.  
The investors in GSE RMBS assume interest rate risk on the 
securitized mortgages, while the GSEs retain the credit risk through 
their guaranties of timely payment of principal and interest on the 
MBS.  The GSEs have been in conservatorship since 2008 and their 
conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, has pushed them 
to reduce risk levels (without mandating any particular form of de-
risking).  Fannie and Freddie both opted to transfer part of the credit 
risk on the MBS they guaranty on a synthetic basis, entering into credit 
default swaps with SPEs that fund themselves with CLNs and invest 
the proceeds in highly liquid, safe assets.     
Notably, the GSEs do not transfer all of the credit risk on the 
RMBS pool.  Instead, they retain the first loss position of 0.5% of the 
reference pool (much like an insurance deductible), as well as the senior 
97% of the pool.259  They sell only a second-loss mezzanine slice of 
2.5% of the pool to investors, but also retain at least 5% of all 
mezzanine tranches, for a total transfer of 2.375% of the credit risk on 
the reference pool.260    
A transfer of 2.375% of the credit risk may sound small, but it 
is most of the first 3% of loss on the pool, which exceeds expected 
loss in most scenarios.  The idea is that the GSEs will bear normal 
operating risk, the CLN investors will bear the risk of a serious market 
downturn, and the GSEs (and thus effectively the federal government) 
will bear the tail risk of a market catastrophe.  From 2013 to November 
2018, Fannie and Freddie collectively transferred over $65 billion in 
credit risk on over $2.2 trillion in mortgages through synthetic 
structures.261  While $65 billion is a fairly small slice of the $10 trillion 
mortgage market, it is a large percentage of the most immediate 
exposure to losses in the mortgage market. 
 
259 See, e.g., Fannie Mae, Offering Memorandum, Connecticut Avenue Securities Trust 
2018-R07, at 4, available at https://bit.ly/2BiIO27.   
260   This risk retention is not mandated by section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
does not cover synthetic securitizations.  
261 Urban Institute, Housing Finance Policy Center, Housing Finance at a Glance:  Monthly 
Chartbook, Jan. 2019, at 27.   
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The synthetic credit risk transfer programs have substantially 
de-risked the GSEs.  In so doing, the GSEs have reoriented the credit 
markets.  Those seeking high risk-high return participations in the 
housing credit now take CLN positions in these GSE synthetics.  
Previously, investors demanding credit risk on mortgages had to 
purchase PLS.  We look here for a partial explanation for the anemic 
nature of the post-crisis nonprime market.  While there are 
endogenous reasons for its failure to revive, the emergence of a new 
market in first loss mortgage credit risk has also contributed to the lack 
of investor interest.   
2.  Naked Synthetics 
 Nothing requires a party buying CDS protection to be reducing 
the risk on its own portfolio of corporate loans or other debt securities.  
Speculators not seeking to protect their portfolios buy swap protection 
on a “naked” basis.  Here the swap protection buyer, rather than 
reducing risk on a debt security that it owns, wants to bet that a 
referenced debt security it does not own is going to default.   
Synthetic securitization was adapted to facilitate these naked 
bets.  The structure is the same as in a bank’s balance sheet 
securitization, except that the debt securities referenced under the 
swap can be any extant debt securities on which the parties agree.  Such 
naked synthetic structures proliferated prior to the financial crisis 
based on reference portfolios of CDOs tied to the residential real 
estate market.  The structures provided a cheap and quick means to 
sell a long position in CDOs (to the buyer of the CLNs) and, on the 
other side of the transaction, to place a bet that CDOs were going to 
default.  Those on the long side of the structures lost their investments, 
while the shorts became rich.262       
A handful of bank swap desks remain ready to put longs and 
shorts together in these structures. 263   Pension funds and asset 
managers looking for yield take the long positions.  Today’s 
transactions differ from pre-crisis transactions in two respects: first, 
 
262 Bratton & Levitin, supra note 1, at 858.  
263 These banks are BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, and 
Société Générale.  See The Synthetic CDO, A Villain of the Global Financial Crisis, is Back, 
available at https://bit.ly/2S2kjAN.  
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today’s reference security is not a security at all but a credit default 
swap index; and, second, durations have shortened from around seven 
to ten years to two or three. 264  Volume appears to be modest. 
3.  Credit Default Swaps 
It bears noting that there is a discontinuity in the post-crisis 
treatment of credit default swaps under the bank capital rules.  We 
have seen that equity support requirements for investment in 
structured products rose dramatically. 265  There also have been 
increases applied to bank exposures to other financial firms, apparently 
for the purpose discouraging interconnectedness.266 Regulatory capital 
relief stemming from inter-bank CDS arrangements continues without 
modification267 despite interconnectedness.   
The pattern can be explained by the reference to Dodd-Frank’s 
new regime of swap intermediation.   The banks were the focal point 
players in the pre-crisis swap market—counterparties took positions 
with bank dealers whose job it was to match the exposure with a client 
taking the opposite position. Many worried that the resulting 
exposures could lead to a financial crisis.  But, as it turned out, when a 
crisis did occur, swap exposures did not figure prominently as a cause.  
They did, however, become an aggravating factor.  When Lehman 
Brothers collapsed, leaving behind an opaque $21 billion over-the-
counter dealer portfolio and a wave of cancelled transactions and 
unmet claims,268 a new and substantial dose of downside risk shook the 
markets at an inopportune time. 
Dodd-Frank title VII addresses the problem of bank swap 
exposure by pushing most swaps out of the banks.  It mandates that 
the creation, clearing, and trading of standardized swap transactions be 
conducted by central clearing counterparties (CCPs).269  The CCPs, 
which amount to swap exchanges, had to be created for the occasion.   
 
264 Id.  See also Bloomberg, As Synthetic CDOs Roar Back, A Young Citi Trader Makes Her 
Name, available at https://bloom.bg/2xI2mvU.  
265 See supra text accompanying notes 87-96. 
266 Jill Cetina et al., More Transparency Needed For Bank Capital Relief Trades, Office of 
Financial research Brief Series 15-04, June 11, 2015 available at https://bit.ly/2S2kCvr.  
267 Id.  
268 Treasury Report, supra note 89, at 115-16. 
269 The CFTC promulgated rules to determine which swaps are required to be cleared by 
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With central clearing, the exchange is the counterparty, all 
contracts are standardized, a short position automatically matches 
every long position, and all of the exchange’s counterparties must post 
a margin.  In theory, this arrangement reduces counterparty default risk 
(and therefore systemic risk) by assuring balanced exposures and 
limiting a given counterparty’s exposure to the CCP itself rather than 
to a broad range of other financial institutions.  The CCP also serves 
as a regulatory focal point for imposition of capital and liquidity 
standards on all players.    
The transition to CCPs has been substantially accomplished.  
Figure 7, produced by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, shows trading activity and signals a remarkable shift from 
over-the-counter to CCP: as Dodd-Frank mandates became effective 
in 2013, the CCPs suddenly became the venue for 90% of trading 
activity.270   
 
registered CCPs in 2011. Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 76 Fed. Reg. 
44464 (July 26, 2011).  Mandatory CCP clearing directives began in 2013.   U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, Press Release No. 6607-13 (Jun. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6607-13.  
Title VII also imposes data reporting requirements and a new set of registration 
requirements and capital requirements on OTC dealers. The CFTC promulgated its swap 
dealer registration rules in 2012.  Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 
77 Fed. Reg. 2613 (Jan. 19, 2012). 
270 Iñaki Aldasoro & Torsten Ehlers, The Credit Default Swap Market: What a Difference a 
Decade Makes, BIS Q. REV., June 2018, at 1, 45. 
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Figure 7. Credit Default Swaps Percentage of Centrally Cleared 
Trading Volume271 
 
It should be noted that the trading figures overstate the 
prominence of CCPs because trading tends to be concentrated in 
recent short-term contracts.  The CCPs’ share of new contracts is 
slightly lower: by mid-2017, the CCPs were the venue for 87% of all 
new interest rate swap transactions and about 79% of index credit 
default swaps.272  Movement to CCPs has rationalized the market, 
causing a steep drop in the notional amount outstanding.273    
Unfortunately, the CCP transition raises as many questions as 
it answers.  CCPs do absorb risks.  But they also concentrate them. 
ICE Clear Credit dominates the dollar-denominated segment with 
upwards of 80% of the contracts.274  Margin arrangements, introduced 
to reduce risk, also create it: an ICE Clear Credit margin call against a 
big player could have disruptive consequences.  The banks remain in 
the system as risk bearers—as with nonbank mortgage lending, they 
now participate on an indirect basis.  Each big bank has multiple 
 
271 ISDA Swapsinfo available at https://bit.ly/2S9nPt5.  
272 Treasury Report, supra note 89, at 121-22.  A Bank for International Settlements study 
shows that the real numbers on swap creation are elusive.  The one thing that is clear is that 
CCPs contracts are displacing inter-dealer contracts.  Inter-dealer positions shrank from 57% 
of outstanding contracts globally in 2011 to 25% by the end of 2017 with CCP contracts 
making up 55%.  Aldasoro & Ehlers, supra note 270, at 4. 
273 Id. at 4, 6. 
274 Id. at 6-7. 
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exposures to CCPs: it is a user of the services of several of them; it is 
an equity investor in one or more of them;275 it is a lender to one or 
more of them; and it is a provider of depository and custodial services 
to one or more of them.276    Critics, variously pointing out new risks 
implicit in the structure,277 question its safety and soundness.     
There are telling comparisons with mortgage and corporate 
lending.  In all three cases, post-crisis reforms have pushed risk out of 
the banks even as the banks simultaneously retain risk on a secondary 
basis as financiers.  In all cases there are questions about the safety and 
soundness of the nonbank replacements and salience of the risk 
retained by the banks.  But there is also a big distinction.  With 
mortgage and corporate lending, the transition was inadvertent and 
new nonbanks flew in under the regulatory radar.  With swaps, the 
transition was an ex ante regulatory strategy designed to bring new 
nonbanks into existence under in a heavily regulated context.  It is not 
clear that this is a distinction with a difference. 
D.   Structured Investment Vehicles 
Structured Investment Vehicles or “SIVs,” were the shadow 
banks par excellence of the pre-crisis era,278 combining aspects of a 
bank, a securitization, and a hedge fund.  The banks created and 
 
275 At the time of transition to CCPs in 2013, 14% of them were directly owned or 
managed by banks. Dietrich Domanski et al., Central Clearing: Trends and Current Issues, BIS Q. 
REV., Dec. 2015 at 59, 63. 
276 Id. at 62-63. 
277 See, e.g., Rama Cont, Central Clearing and Risk Transformation, Norges Bank Working 
Paper 3/27 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955647 (contending that central clearing 
transforms counterparty risk into liquidity risk; and that the main focus of risk management 
should member liquidity and CCP liquidity resources); Albert J. Menkveld, Crowded Positions: 
An Overlooked Systemic Risk for Central Clearing Parties, 7 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 209 
(2017)(discussing systematic risk associated with crowded positions and showing that CCP 
risk management does not account it); Paul Glasserman et al., Hidden Illiquidity with Multiple 
Central Counterparties, Oct. 30, 2014 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2519647 (arguing 
that multiple memberships permit evasion of margin requirements); Stephen J. Lubben, Failure 
of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank’s Fatal Flaw? 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV 127 (2015)(discussing Dodd-
Frank’s failure to provide a process for failed CCPs).  Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous Case for 
Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 463 (2013)(discussing whether clearinghouses 
create systemic risk); Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses:  When “Skin in the Game” Is 
Not Enough, the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. REG. 101 (2017) (arguing that 
clearinghouse ownership structures are key to the risks implicit in clearinghouses).  
278  Henry Tabe, Shadow Banking and Leaking SIVs (July 4, 2011) available at  
https://bit.ly/2DQ7Yqu.  
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advised them initially as unregulated, off-balance sheet alter egos 
holding assets that suffered unfavorable treatment under the bank 
capital rules.  With a SIV, such investment could be financed with an 
all-debt capital structure. The banks’ SIVs went on to become holders 
of diversified portfolios of actively managed, highly-rated (mostly 
securitized) assets funded through the issuance of medium-term notes 
and commercial paper.279  Like a bank, a SIV arbitraged the spread in 
yields between long-term debt investments and short-term liabilities.  
Like a hedge fund, there was an advisory relationship and an absence 
of deposit-based funding.  Like a securitization, there was an SPE and 
tranched debt.   
A variant, the “SIV-Lite” invested more heavily in mortgage 
related assets and relied on shorter term funding.280  The SIV-Lites 
played a key role in the subprime mortgage market.  They were set up 
by the big nonbank home mortgage originators—American Home 
Mortgage, GMAC, Lehman, New Century, and the like281—as captive 
providers of short-term warehouse funding for portfolios of home 
mortgages in transit to RMBSs.  The SIV-Lites bought repos from 
their sponsors and funded their repo portfolios with asset-backed 
commercial paper.282   
The sponsors, whether of SIVs or SIV-Lites, maintained close 
ties to their entities.  The sponsor designed the entity’s investment plan 
and served as its investment advisor, acted as the dealer when the entity 
invested, and arranged for financing with debt investors.  On the 
upside, the management contract with the sponsor drained out the 
SIV’s profits in the form of incentive compensation.283  The sponsors 
also took the downside risk, holding the subordinated debt that as a 
practical matter served as the equity in the entity.284   
The bank sponsors promised back up liquidity support in 
addition.  SIVs had to refinance between 20% and 50% of their debt 
 
279 TABE, supra note 1, at 6.     
280 ID. at 125-26. 
281 Kim et al., supra note 159, at 365-68. 
282 TABE, supra note 1, at 18. 
283  BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE JOINT FORUM REPORT ON 
SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES 55-56 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf.   
284 Bratton & Levitin, supra note 1, at 838-41. 
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every year.  To ameliorate the resulting refunding risk, the bank 
sponsors promised to provide funding (or promised to repurchase SIV 
assets) if the external markets proved unwilling.  The commitments, 
however, were subject to a cap of 5% to 10% of the entity’s total assets.  
The SIV-Lites, which were not sponsored by banks, relied on backup 
liquidity commitments from commercial banks with at least AAA 
credit ratings.285 
At the beginning of 2007 this was a $400 billion sector.286  By 
October 2008 every SIV and SIV-Lite had lapsed into insolvency.287  
Their lenders, suddenly wary of subprime-related assets, refused to roll 
over the SIVs short-term funding beginning in June 2007.  It was a 
classic case in which a small drop in the value of a firm’s assets triggers 
the firm’s failure due to combination of high leverage and short 
duration financing.288  Asset fire sales followed.  Senior lenders to SIV-
Lites and SIVs unaffiliated with big banks suffered losses of 60% to 
95%; junior lenders were wiped out.289  Lenders to big bank SIVs did 
better.  Despite an absence of a contractual duty to do so, the bank 
sponsors took their SIVs back to their own balance sheets, partly to 
protect their own reputations and partly to ameliorate distress in the 
asset markets.290  The bank SIV lenders were doubly lucky when the 
banks were later bailed out by the government. 
The SIVs, then, were the canary in the coal mine of the 
financial crisis.  They have not come back.291 One reason concerns the 
 
285 Kim et al., supra note 159, at 18. 
286 Sanjiv Das & Seoyoung Kim, The Design and Risk Management of Structured Finance 
Vehicle, 9 J. FIN. RISK MGT. 12, 12-13 (2016). 
287 There was quite a bit of ex post litigation, see, e.g., Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. 
Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 888 F.Supp.2d 431 S.D.N.Y 2012), aff’d in part Pennsylvania Public 
School Employees’ Retirement System v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 772 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2014; King County, Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 2012 WL 11896326 
(S.D.N.Y.). 
288 Das & Kim, supra note 286, at [19]. 
289 Tabe, supra note 278.   
290 Bratton & Levitin, supra note 1, at 842-43.  
291 They are spoken of in the past tense, see, e.g., Tabe, supra note 278, and there is no 
mention of them other than in the past sense on anything posted on the internet.  To make 
doubly sure of this, we checked the 2017 10-Ks of the largest four banks (JP Morgan, Bank of 
America, Wells Fargo and Citi).  No SIVs were noted.  The VIEs with the closest resemblance 
are the banks’ asset backed commercial paper conduits, which involve active management, 
credit enhancement, and liquidity support commitments but no retention of junior debt.  Even 
so, Citibank opts for balance sheet treatment. See Citigroup, Inc. Form 10-K for the Fiscal 
 
4/26/19] A TALE OF TWO MARKETS 
 
© 2019, William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin 
81 
line of business: no one makes highly levered investments in CDOs 
anymore.  Nonbank mortgage lenders still need warehouse financing, 
but today they get it from the banks rather than from captive SPEs.292  
The other reason is regulatory.  The regulatory arbitrage that originally 
motivated the banks to sponsor SIVs is no longer available.  A SIV, 
arranged as described above, is the core example of a variable interest 
entity required to be consolidated under GAAP.  The bank sponsor 
controls the assets, retains the riskiest tranche in the all-debt capital 
structure, and also takes an upside in the form of a performance fee, 
resulting in a clear case for consolidation.  Today, to keep such an 
entity off-balance sheet, a bank would have to turn the management 
over to a third-party or keep its hands clean of significant financial 
stakes in the assets.293 Because these choices are unattractive, SIVs no 
longer exist.  
 
IV.  EVALUATION 
Our review of post-crisis regulation and market innovation in 
mortgage and structured finance markets is a tale of two markets.  The 
centerpiece of post-crisis mortgage market regulation is an absolute 
prohibition on making mortgages without regard for the borrower’s 
ability to repay.  It is a standards-based approach with substantial 
flexibility, but it is a prohibition nonetheless.  In contrast, no absolute 
prohibitions exist in post-crisis regulation of structured finance 
markets.  This contrasting approach is notable because the focus on 
 
Year Ended December 31. 2017, available at https://bit.ly/2UFNZAJ.   
292 See supra text accompanying note 98. 
293 Here is Bank of America’s pertinent statement of accounting policy: 
The Corporation consolidates a customer or other investment vehicle if 
it has control over the initial design of the vehicle or manages the assets 
in the vehicle and also absorbs potentially significant gains or losses 
through an investment in the vehicle, derivative contracts or other 
arrangements. The Corporation does not consolidate an investment 
vehicle if a single investor controlled the initial design of the vehicle or 
manages the assets in the vehicles or if the Corporation does not have a 
variable interest that could potentially be significant to the vehicle. 
Bank of America Corporation Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2017, 
supra note 102, at 111. 
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government intervention during the crisis itself was in the capital 
markets, not the consumer markets.  
We suggest that the difference in the post-crisis regulatory 
treatment reflects the distinct political economy of financial regulation:  
there is likely to be more intense political pressure for aggressive 
regulation in consumer markets than in capital markets because of the 
salience of consumer market regulation to voters, who are themselves 
consumers.  The presence of more intense political pressure for reform 
in the consumer markets means that Congress and regulators are more 
likely to focus their efforts on consumer markets than on capital 
markets.   
The post-crisis regulatory responses also exhibit a basic set of 
features that Professor Roberta Romano suggests as an “Iron Law” of 
financial regulation.  Specifically, she argues that new financial 
regulation (1) responds to crises, (2) is undertaken on inadequate 
informational basis, (3) employs poorly-tailored off-the-rack regulatory 
solutions that inevitably fail to account for the dynamism of financial 
markets, and (4) remains on the books longer than is useful because 
the U.S. political system favors maintenance of the status quo.294 
To counter the workings of this Iron Law, Professor Romano 
would build a deregulatory bias into the system.  The costs of sticky 
and ill-tailored regulatory responses to crises, she argues, should be 
checked by (1) mandatory sunset provisions in legislation, and (2) a 
structure that is hospitable to regulatory experimentation.295   
Our retrospective review of post-crisis regulation suggests that 
Professor Romano’s “Iron Law” is correct in some notable respects.   
But our review in the end it provides no support for a shift to a sunset-
based regime, for some post-crisis regulation succeeds at its intended 
 
294 See Romano, Further Assessment of the Iron law of Financial Regulation, supra note 5, at 1; see 
also Romano, Regulating in the Dark, supra note 5, at 1. 
295 See Romano, Further Assessment of the Iron law of Financial Regulation, supra note 5, at 37. 
Romano’s policy proposals have been cogently challenged by Professor John Coffee Jr. as 
more likely to ensure regulation that favors the financial services industry than well-tailored 
regulation.  Coffee, supra note 3, at 1022-1025.  But see Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, 
in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN:  THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 96-99 (Cary 
Coglianese, ed. 2012) (responding to Coffee’s critiques).  
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and beneficent purpose.  Given such success, mandatory sunsets 
would be precipitous and destructive.   
The post-2008 regulation of mortgage and structured finance 
markets was emphatically crisis driven, and a number of the responses 
were incomplete and off-the-rack, just as Professor Romano predicts.  
Indeed, we have shown that regulators and enforcers focused only on 
the pieces of the causal puzzle most susceptible to off-the-rack 
treatment.  Our review also confirms Professor Romano’s prediction 
that dynamic financial markets will undermine some of the drafters’ 
objectives—they already have begun to do so with the remarkable 
reappearance of largely unregulated nonbank mortgage lenders.  As to 
stickiness, it remains too early to tell.  While we certainly have seen the 
banks push back successfully against the regulators and enforcers at a 
couple of junctures, such as the creation of the “balance sheet” patch 
for QM status and the FHFA’s retreat on originator putback 
vulnerability, nothing in our account fundamentally undercuts 
Romano’s projection of embeddedness.  Some of the regulation 
surveyed here may be eroded or tweaked, indeed, the D.C. Circuit has 
already started the process in its ruling on the risk retention rule.  But 
we expect the main Dodd-Frank edifice to remain intact.   
 Yet even as this Article’s review of post-crisis regulation and 
markets largely confirms Professor Romano’s prediction, its nuanced 
picture also supports a more positive evaluation.  The new regime 
constraining risky mortgage lending is working as intended.  And it is 
not off-the-rack:  the ability-to-repay requirement incorporates a novel 
approach to on-the-ground safety-and-soundness regulation.  
Subprime mortgages will not be coming back, even as nonprime has 
gained a toehold.  No doubt that this new risk-constraining regime will 
prove in time to be deeply embedded.  But we foresee no salient 
perverse effects, for the regulations plug a hole that ought to stay 
plugged.  Sometimes mandated financial conservatism just makes 
sense.  Ability-to-repay has traditionally been a cornerstone of prudent 
lending practice under the rubric of borrower “capacity.”  The market’s 
disregard of that long-standing wisdom had disastrous consequences.  
We see nothing to regret about this mandated return to traditional 
standards.    
Of course, the ability-to-repay mandate’s utility as a preventer 
of future crises remains to be tested.  The new nonprime market has 
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not yet tapped (and may never manage to tap) into a source of demand 
for yield that causes it to push against the ability-to-repay standards.  
We view the new mortgage servicing regulations similarly.  They apply 
new solutions in new territory and could do a lot of good in the next 
recession, subject to the caveat that more intensive regulation probably 
will follow as the regime is tested in practice.   
 We turn now to the pattern of securitization regulation. This 
certainly has an “off-the-rack” aspect: the constraints follow from 
extensions of existing regimes of securities regulation and bank 
capitalization.  Even so, the contrast with the new regime of consumer-
oriented regulations could not be more telling.  Where the consumer 
regulations flatly prohibit risk-taking, the securitization regulations 
leave the business of trading off risk and return to actors in the 
marketplace.  Serious constraints emerge only for the banks, where the 
interface of the risk retention requirement, the new capital rules, and 
the new accounting treatments transform securitization origination 
from a sharply favored to a sharply disfavored business practice.  For 
non-bank securitizers the picture is radically different, for they operate 
free of capital mandates.  Reg AB II makes public offerings of 
securitized debt more expensive for all entities. But a huge private 
placement loophole remains in place   
Overall then, the regulators have left open a door for a revived 
market in private label structured products.  As to residential 
mortgages the markets have not yet accepted the invitation.  But as to 
other asset classes, private label securitization has revived and 
innovation proceeds apace.  The market has even expanded in the case 
of CLOs.  And synthetic securitization, the most potentially toxic of 
all variations, survives and thrives.  As to balance sheet synthetic 
structures, no regulation stands in the way so long as a bank is not 
involved, despite the structure’s poor track record.  Their use has even 
been encouraged by a federal regulator as a method of de-risking 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.   As to naked structures, the banks are 
as ready as ever to meet customer demand.    
We note in addition that there are salient cases of innovation 
in the new regulations governing structured products.  This isn’t all 
off-the-rack.    The accounting standard setters achieved a ground up 
reconceptualization of the consolidation rules, importing substantive 
integrity to the law of structured products for the first time.  The 
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accounting rules, joined by the ability-to-repay rules and the bank 
capital rules on securitization, also move away from rules-based to 
principles-based regulation that may be politically more palatable 
because of the flexibility it maintains in the regulatory system to deal 
with financial market innovation.  (The securitization disclosure rules 
move in the opposite direction, but only after a notably unsuccessful 
experiment with a principles-based disclosure regime.)   
 An even more notable regulatory innovation came in the form 
of post-crisis enforcement initiatives of unprecedented scope and 
magnitude.  These too had an off-the-rack aspect, targeting familiar 
matters of fraud and consumer abuse and avoiding the problematic 
enforcement terrain presented by the ill-conceived risk-taking in 
sophisticated financial markets and resulting externalities.  Their 
ongoing deterrent power, moreover, is questionable.  But they entail 
no stickiness and may have done some good.   
CONCLUSION 
Post-crisis regulation is less than perfect.  But to interpolate 
perfection as the evaluative standard for regulation is to build in an 
automatic preference for deregulation based on a Nirvana fallacy.  We 
thus think that a collection of less-then-perfect reforms still can be 
endorsed.  The particular collection reviewed here pulls off a neat trick, 
for it largely succeeds at tamping down on the products at the epicenter 
of the financial crisis—subprime mortgage loans and the private-label 
securitization that financed those loans—without choking off 
innovation in financial markets more broadly.  Whether it will prevent 
the next crisis, we cannot say, for it may be fire next time.  In that event 
the trio of nonbank centers of risk accumulation identified here—in 
residential mortgage lending, corporate lending, and swap creation—
could occasion regrets and recriminations.  Even so, from the 
perspective of a decade after the crisis, we can comfortably give two 
cheers for the regulatory response.  What it covers it covers well.  The 
problem is that it does not cover enough.  
